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ABSTRACT 
 
In recent years, there have been substantial interests in sustainable processes for the end-
of-life products to conserve natural resource and reduce landfill wastes. Among these process-
es, recycling and remanufacturing provides opportunities for practitioners from various indus-
tries and government regulators to mitigate the environmental impacts while maintaining eco-
nomic viability. Meanwhile, there are substantial critical decisions for the decision/policy mak-
ers to reap to the economic and environmental benefits from the recycling and remanufactur-
ing processes. Therefore, in this study, I investigate the product weight reduction and used-
product collection decisions in the context of closed loop supply chains with product recycling. 
Furthermore, from a real options perspective, I investigate the optimal timing of remanufactur-
ing with the remanufacturing cost following a stochastic process, and the optimal timing of re-
manufacturing and replacement with the maintenance costs following stochastic processes. 
Also, in this study, I investigate the influences of the governmental economic instruments on 
the recycling and remanufacturing decisions, and examine the environmental viability of these 
sustainable incentives. A series of managerial insights and policy implications are obtained from 
analytical and numerical analyses. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, there have been substantial interests in the sustainable processes for the end-
of-life products to reduce resource consumption and landfill wastes. Among these processes, 
recycling and remanufacturing provides opportunities for firms from a variety of industries to 
mitigate the environmental impacts while maintaining economic viability. Toner cartridge recy-
cling is a 3 billion dollar industry [1] and 90% (in weight) of the recycled materials are utilized in  
the new toner cartridges [2]. Also, Panasonic diverted thousands of tons of cathode ray tubes 
(CRT’s) from landfill through recycling process, and utilized the recycled glass, metal, and plas-
tics in the production of new CRT’s [3]. within the U.S., the remanufacturing industry involves 
more than 73,000 firms and 350,000 people with annual revenue of $53 billion [4]. Overall, re-
manufacturing programs can save companies 40%–65% of the manufacturing cost [1]. Xerox's 
remanufacturing program saved $200 million in material cost in less than five years [5].  
Therefore, from a decision/policy maker’s perspective, there are substantial opportunities to 
reap the economic and environmental benefits of the remanufacturing and recycling processes, 
such as closed loop supply chain management, sustainable product design, used-product acqui-
sition strategy, remanufacturing timing, as well as governmental subsidies and fees. 
With this knowledge, in this study, we aim to understand the economically rational decisions 
on (i) the product weight reduction and used-product collection efforts in the context of closed 
loop supply chains with recycling; (ii) the product remanufacturing decision with uncertain re-
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manufacturing cost; as well as (iii) the product remanufacturing and replacement decisions with 
uncertain O&M cost (i.e., operations and maintenance cost). Specifically,  
Toward the research objective (i), we formulate three closely related CLSC models consisting 
of a manufacturer who also recycles used products and a collector of the used products. The 
first CLSC is a centralized model with the vertical integration of the manufacturer and the col-
lector. The second CLSC is a decentralized model with the manufacturer as the leader and the 
collector as the follower in a Stackelberg game. The third CLSC is a decentralized model with 
government subsidy and fee. In addition, we formulate a non-recycling model as a benchmark 
for comparison. 
Under this framework, the analytic results show that (a) conditions (e.g., the increase (de-
crease) of the marginal recycling benefit or the collecting subsidy) leading to a higher (lower) 
level of the collection rate may also result in a higher (lower) level of the product weight, and 
vice versa. Hence, decision makers may not be able to pursue an improvement of both factors 
simultaneously, and it is advised to consider the negative impact on the other factor before any 
efforts on improving one factor. As a consequence, (b) the increase (decrease) of the marginal 
recycling benefit or the collecting subsidy (for a unit weight of used-product collected) may re-
sult in a higher level of the landfill quantity when the marginal recycling benefit or the collect-
ing subsidy is sufficiently high (lower). In this sense, efforts on improving one factor should not 
be supported unconditionally, as it may make the environment worse off. (c) Under the reve-
nue-neutrality framework (i.e., the amount of subsidies disbursed balances the amount of fees 
collected), the landfill quantity in the centralized model can be achieved or even further re-
duced in the decentralized model by choosing a proper value of subsidy. However, inappropri-
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ate value of subsidy may also result in inferior environmental performance (i.e., more landfill 
quantity) relative to the non-subsidy case. Given these findings, the pricing of subsidy/fee be-
comes critical to achieve high environmental efficiency and avoid unintended negative envi-
ronmental consequences. 
Toward the research objective (ii), we consider a firm that leases a single product to a ser-
vice provider, and the firm is also responsible for the maintenance of the product. For instance, 
Xerox leases photocopiers to Staples which provides copying services to customers. Throughout 
a product's lifecycle, as the maintenance cost increases (due to component-deterioration), at 
any time point, the firm has an option to terminate the life of the product and remanufacture 
it. During the remanufacturing process, depending on the physical condition, components are 
either reused or replaced and disposed. After the remanufacturing process, the product is re-
stored to a like-new condition and re-leased to the service provider. We note that the flexibility 
on remanufacturing described above lends itself to a real options approach. That is, the firm 
has the right, but not the obligation, to make changes to its business project under uncertainty. 
Moreover, in the extended scenario, government participation is incorporated into our model 
in the form of remanufacturing subsidy and disposal fee. 
The critical findings of research topic (ii) include: (a) The uncertainty of remanufacturing cost 
is the driver for decision makers to prolong the product life and defer the exercise of remanu-
facturing option because the uncertainty increases the value of holding the flexibility; (b) In-
creasing the remanufacturing subsidy (disposal fee) incentivizes decision makers to exercise the 
remanufacturing option earlier (later) because the subsidy reduces (increases) the cost of exer-
cising the option now. That is, the value of waiting is diminished; (c) An increase of the remanu-
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facturing subsidy (disposal fee) may result in more industrial wastes because it entails a shorter 
product life (lower reuse fraction of materials); (d) As the remanufacturing cost becomes more 
uncertain, the policy maker is advised to increase the remanufacturing subsidy or decrease the 
disposal fee because these adjustments balance the higher level of landfill disposal stemmed 
from the higher uncertainty.  We hope that these findings, as the first research findings on the 
remanufacturing decisions via a real options approach will stimulate relevant discussions 
among industrial practitioners, governmental regulators, environmental groups, as well as aca-
demics. 
Toward the research objective (iii), we consider a firm that leases a product to a service pro-
vider, and the firm is assumed to be responsible for the O&M costs of the product. The O&M 
costs for the durable parts and the non-durable parts are assumed to follow uncorrelated geo-
metric Brownian motion (GBM) processes. Throughout the product's life-cycle, the firm has two 
options for the product: remanufacturing option and replacement option. With these options, 
the firm has the right, but not the obligation, to remanufacture or replace the product at any 
point. In particular, the exercise of the remanufacturing option triggers the ultimate mainte-
nance for the product by replacing the non-durable parts with new ones. The replacement op-
tion triggers the replacement of the product as a whole. 
The analytical and numerical findings in (iii) include that (a) as the O&M costs become more 
(less) volatile, it is beneficial to exercise the remanufacturing and the replacement options later 
(earlier); (b) a higher (lower) remanufacturing cost results in a shorter (longer) expected prod-
uct life because it becomes less attractive for the firm to conduct ultimate maintenance for the 
product through remanufacturing; (c) an increase of the remanufacturing subsidy may result in 
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more landfill disposal per unit time, and the government policy maker is advised to carefully 
examine the industrial conditions before any implementation of a new sustainable subsidy or 
adjustment of the existing sustainable subsidy. We hope that the questions raised and ad-
dressed in this study will stimulate relevant discussions among industrial practitioners, govern-
mental regulators, and academics. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive literature 
review relevant to this research. In Chapter 3, we formulate and analyze a series of closed loop 
supply chain models for the product weight reduction and the collection rate decisions with 
product recycling. In Chapter 4, we formulate and analyze the models for the product remanu-
facturing decision from a real options perspective with the remanufacturing cost following a 
GBM process. Similarly, we utilized the real options approach to investigate the remanufactur-
ing and replacement decisions when the maintenance costs are assumed to following the GBM 
processes in Chapter 5. Finally, the conclusions and future works are presented in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
As this research is associated with several streams of research topics, we will review the rele-
vant articles of each topic as follows.  
A growing literature in CLSC and reverse logistics addresses management issues such as 
channel design [11][13], technical investments [70], and pricing strategy [20]. In these papers, 
the environmental performance is measured by a single factor such as return rate [11][13], 
remanufacturability [70], and collection quantity [20]. Geyer et al. [5] demonstrated the signifi-
cance of coordinating the investments in product durability and collection rate. However, the 
study is based on numerical analysis, and analytic results are not observable. In this paper, by 
considering variable product weight and collection rate, we examine the interaction between 
two factors and their environmental consequences.  
There are numerous articles relevant to product take-back and recycling focusing on tactical 
and operational issues such as inventory control [71], shop floor control [72], logistics network 
design [73], and material resource planning [74]. We refer readers to [4] a comprehensive liter-
ature review. Recently, there has been a shift in emphasis towards the economics of product 
reuse and recycle. Guide et al. [12] demonstrated that the product acquisition and cost saving 
are the critical drivers of recycling profitability. Debo et al. [75] investigated the impact of con-
sumer profiles and technology investment on the recycling profitability. Our study investigates 
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the economic relationship between the product weight and the collection rate in the context of 
CLSC’s. 
We now proceed to review the relevant articles on product weight. Huang et al. [6] claimed 
that light weight have been taken as the design principles of electronic products. Kleiner et al. 
[76] pointed out the significance of lightweight design in engineering, transportation, and archi-
tecture industries, and demonstrated the feasibility of reducing product weight via utilizing 
lighter materials and/or reducing the product size. Atasu et al. [12] pointed out that, since 
WEEE targets are unilaterally weight-based, most producers do not have an incentive to invest 
in environmental design. Hence, our study examines the interaction between investment in 
product weight reduction and used product taking back activities. Furthermore, Atasu et al. [12] 
also claimed that the cost to the environment depends on the product's physical properties 
such as weight. Align with this claim, landfill quantity (i.e., total weight of products sent to land-
fill) is utilized to in our models to measure the environmental impact of the CLSC’s. 
The use of taxes and subsidies as a tool to improve social welfare has been widely studied 
[77]. Carraro and Topa [78] analyzed the impact of environmental regulation in the form of tax-
ation on the innovation activity of firms. Palmer and Walls [38] utilized a tax/subsidy combina-
tion in which producers of intermediate goods pay a per-pound tax and collectors of used 
products receive a per-pound subsidy from the tax. Aligning with Palmer and Walls, under the 
revenue-neutrality framework, we implement a subsidy/fee system which charges the manu-
facturer a weight-based production fee, and subsidies the collector for the weight of products 
collected. We note that Mrozek [39] argued that, to achieve the maximum efficiency, depos-
it/refund systems must be implemented in a way that the revenue is neutral. 
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Furthermore, in recent years, there have been increasing interests in examining the uncer-
tainties in decision making process of product remanufacturing. Denizel et al. [58] investigated 
a hybrid production planning problem where the inputs (i.e., used products) are subject to dif-
ferent and uncertain quality levels. In [74], it was demonstrated that the remanufacturing cost 
is approximately linear to the quantified quality deterioration. Robotics et al. [79] also consid-
ered a firm that remanufactures products and makes investment decisions on increasing the 
reusability of its products. Assuming a normal distribution of the remanufacturing cost, they 
claimed that uncertainty of the remanufacturing cost may not hinder this investment, depend-
ing on the inspection capabilities and technologies. Similarly, by assuming a uniform distribu-
tion of product quality, Galbreth and Blackburn [57] investigated the optimal acquisition and 
sorting policies. Siddiqui and Marnay [80] investigated the investment decision on a distributed 
generation unit fuelled by natural gas for a microgrid. By modeling the natural gas generation 
cost as stochastic process, they found the cost threshold that triggers the investment. Unlike 
[57][79][80], this paper studies the dynamic feature of the remanufacturing cost by assuming it 
follows a stochastic process. Also, we demonstrate that the uncertainty of the product quality 
actually motivates decision makers to defer the remanufacturing. Readers may refer to Guide 
[4] for a thorough review on the uncertainties in the product remanufacturing process.  
The real options analysis, originated from finance, has been extended to the decision making 
processes with uncertainties in expansion, replacement, and abandonment. Adkins and Paxson 
[81] investigated the switching option between two energy sources by assuming that feedstock 
prices follow GBM. Wickart and Madlener [82] investigated the optimal technology investment 
timing for power plants with both fuel price and electricity price following GBM. These articles 
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differ from our approach in the sense that the prices are modeled as stochastic, not the cost 
components. On the other hand, Ye [83] modeled the maintenance cost as a GBM process and 
utilized the optimal stopping method to solve the equipment replacement problem. Zambujal-
Oliveira and Duque [53] extended the replacement problem by considering maintenance cost 
and equipment salvage value as GBM processes. More recently, Min et al. [84] investigated the 
entry and the exit of the renewable power producers by modeling the operating and mainte-
nance cost as GBM. Adkins and Paxson [81] studied the optimal replacement and abandonment 
decisions for real assets. The exit decision in [84], the replacement decision in [81], and the re-
manufacturing decision in this paper can all be considered as optimal-stopping problems. How-
ever, this paper, to our knowledge, is the first study to model remanufacturing cost as a sto-
chastic process, and investigate the optimal remanufacturing timing from a real options per-
spective. The remanufacturing cost uncertainty stems from the uncertainties in end-of-life-
product quality and component replacement cost. 
Furthermore, in recent years, there has been increasing interest in utilizing the real options 
approach in engineering disciplines. Mikaelian et al. [85] developed a qualitative study for a ho-
listic consideration of real options in enterprise architecture through mechanisms and types. 
The benefit of this new development was demonstrated over traditional real options analysis in 
identifying a broader spectrum for uncertainty management. Cardin et al. [86] proposed a five-
phase taxonomy of procedures to support the design and management of engineering systems 
with uncertainty and flexibility. In this paper, decision makers recognize the uncertainty in re-
manufacturing cost, and have flexibility on the timing of remanufacturing. Readers may refer to 
[87][88] for more comprehensive reviews on real options in an engineering context. 
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CHAPTER 3  
PRODUCT WEIGHT AND COLLECTION RATE DECISIONS IN CLOSED LOOP  
SUPPLY CHAINS WITH PRODUCT RECYCLING 
3.1 Background and Objectives 
In recent years, there have been significant interests in sustainable processing of end-of-life 
products such as recycling to reduce the consumption of raw materials and the landfill disposal. 
A significant part of them is driven by the increasing economic motivations and environmental 
concerns in communities in general, and the manufacturers, collectors, as well as government 
in particular. 
A critical factor relevant to the environmental sustainability is the product weight. In recent 
years, lightweight have been taken as the design principle of electronic products [6]. From an 
environmental perspective, reducing the product weight not only brings down the consumption 
of natural resources, but also reduces the waste disposed at landfills.  
From an economic perspective, a lower level of the product weight implies less materials cost 
and more energy savings. Xerox claimed substantial energy savings and diverted a significant 
amount of materials from the landfill via lightweight design of toner cartridges [7]. The product 
weight could be reduced via utilizing lighter materials [8] and/or reducing the product size 
[9][10]. By shrinking curved zoom lenses, Konica Minolta reduces the weight of single use cam-
era by one third in the last decade [9]. 
11 
 
Another critical factor for the environmental sustainability is the collection rate, which is the 
fraction of the sold products that are collected, and measures the collection efficiency in the 
reverse channel. End-of-life products are taken back to manufacturer [11], and go through the 
value-retrieval process such as remanufacturing or recycling. Hence, the acquisition of used 
products is a key driver for the success of product reuse and recycle [12]. A higher level of the 
collection rate results in both less consumption of new raw materials and less waste in landfills, 
and can be achieved, for example, by investing in advertising/educational campaigns to en-
hance the public awareness of the take-back programs [13].  
Given the significance of both environmental factors, it is highly desirable to understand how 
efforts on improving one factor impact the other factor and the total environmental conse-
quence. Even though numerous environmental targets set by governments are weight-based 
[13], only few analytical studies explain and enhance our understanding such an impact from an 
economically rational perspective. 
As a first step toward this goal of deeper analytical understanding, in this paper, we examine 
the variable product weight and collection rate, as well as their environmental consequence of 
the landfill quantity via a series of straightforward closed-loop supply chains (CLSC’s).  
Essentially, our attempts to answer the following research questions 
(1) Under which condition, product recycling is economically viable? 
(2) How the marginal recycling benefit (with respect to the product weight) influences the 
product weight, the collection rate, and the landfill quantity (i.e., the total weight of prod-
ucts disposed at landfill)? 
(3) How supply chain centralization/decentralization influence the product weight, the collec-
12 
 
tion rate, and the landfill quantity? 
(4) How government subsidy/fee influence the product weight, the collection rate, and the 
landfill quantity? 
(5) Under which condition, subsidizing the collecting activities and taxing the production activ-
ities are environmentally viable? How the high level of environmental efficiency (in terms 
of landfill quantity) in the centralized CLSC model can be achieved or outperformed in the 
decentralized CLSC model by setting appropriate subsidy and fee? 
Specifically, to answer these questions, we formulate three closely related CLSC models con-
sisting of a manufacturer who also recycles used products and a collector of the used products. 
The first CLSC is a centralized model with the vertical integration of the manufacturer and the 
collector. The second CLSC is a decentralized model with the manufacturer as the leader and 
the collector as the follower in a Stackelberg game. The third CLSC is a decentralized model with 
government subsidy and fee. In addition, we formulate a non-recycling model as a benchmark 
for comparison.  
Under this framework, the analytic results show that (i) conditions (e.g., the increase (de-
crease) of the marginal recycling benefit or the collecting subsidy) leading to a higher (lower) 
level of the collection rate may also result in a higher (lower) level of the product weight, and 
vice versa. Hence, decision makers may not be able to pursue an improvement of both factors 
simultaneously, and it is advised to consider the negative impact on the other factor before any 
efforts on improving one factor. As a consequence, (ii) the increase (decrease) of the marginal 
recycling benefit or the collecting subsidy (for a unit weight of used-product collected) may re-
sult in a higher level of the landfill quantity when the marginal recycling benefit or the collect-
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ing subsidy is sufficiently high (lower). In this sense, efforts on improving one factor should not 
be supported unconditionally, as it may make the environment worse off. (iii) Under the reve-
nue-neutrality framework (i.e., the amount of subsidies disbursed balances the amount of fees 
collected), the landfill quantity in the centralized model can be achieved or even further re-
duced in the decentralized model by choosing a proper value of subsidy. However, inappropri-
ate value of subsidy may also result in inferior environmental performance (i.e., more landfill 
quantity) relative to the non-subsidy case. Given these findings, the pricing of subsidy/fee be-
comes critical to achieve high environmental efficiency and avoid unintended negative envi-
ronmental consequences.  
3.2 Closed Loop Supply Chain Models 
For a single product, we consider a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer who sells di-
rectly to his/her customers and a collector who accepts used products from the customers and 
returns the collected used products to the manufacturer for a fee. The manufacturer in turn 
recycles basic materials from the returned products in manufacturing his/her product.  
We note that, for the product in this paper, the fraction of each basic material in weight is 
fixed (e.g., 35% glass, 25% metal, 35% polymer), and does not vary across units of the product. 
We also note that the portion of the non-recyclable materials in this product is assumed to be 
negligible while any used product, that is not collected, is disposed at a landfill. We further note 
that a third-party collector, who is only engaged in the collection activities of used products and 
serves as an intermediary between the manufacturer and his/her customers, is often observed 
in various markets [11].  
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More quantitatively, in the forward channel, the manufacturer sells )(pD  units of the product 
to customers where p ($/unit) denotes the selling price. In the reverse channel, τ fraction of the 
sold products is returned to the collector after use, and is in turn supplied to the manufacturer. 
The   fraction is the collection rate while the manufacturer’s fee to the collector is denoted by 
b  ($/lb).  
Manufacturer
Collector
Collection
τD(p) Landfill
(1 - τ)D(p)
Customers
Sales
D(p)
Take Back
τD(p)
Materials Flow
 
Figure 1. Manufacturer-Collector Closed Loop Supply Chain 
Figure 1 depicts such a closed-loop supply chain, and we note that the aforementioned CRT’s 
is a representative product for such a chain as used CRT’s are recycled into basic materials such 
as glass, metal, and plastics [14]. In what follows, we explain the key assumptions of this paper. 
Assumption 3.1 The planning horizon is a static single period. 
All the decision variables are decided in a single period (see e.g., [11]). This assumption ena-
bles us to concentrate on the fundamental relationships of product weight vs. collection rate, 
centralization vs. decentralization, and without government intervention vs. with government 
intervention without being distracted by dynamic ramifications, which are beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
Assumption 3.2 The investment cost to reduce the product materials weight from 0w  to w  
is )/ln()( 0 wwSwCw   ($) where w  is the product weight while 0S  and 00 ww  . 
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Recently, we observe that lighter weight has become a major business initiative in electronic 
products [6]. For example, Konica and Fujifilm have reduced the weight of single use camera by 
40% in the last decade [9][10]. Meanwhile, the emphasis on lighter weight leads to an increase 
in equipment cost [15][16] as more precise and delicate tools are required to produce the light-
er and smaller-size products.  
Under these circumstances, we make a simplifying assumption that any product composition 
changes due to weight reduction are negligible. Hence, we explained before, the fraction of 
each basic material in weight is still fixed. A representative example is the case of Xerox, which 
was able to reduce the weight of toner cartridges without hard composition change by precise-
ly adjusting the parison extrusion rate, thickness, and distribution [17]. 
As for the functional form, we note that a logarithmic function is utilized to characterize the 
diminishing returns (from a higher to a lower level of product weight) to investment. Maly [18] 
utilized the same functional form to depict the rapidly growing design cost of integrated circuits 
with the decrease of circuit size. Porteus [19] also used similar functional form to investigate 
the investing activities of setup cost reduction.  
For w0, this threshold can be interpreted as the given product weight of the previous genera-
tion or a physical upper bound of the product weight that still maintains commercial viability to 
customers. 
Assumption 3.3 Manufacturing cost wawC 00 )(   ($/unit) where 00 a . 
Electronic industries (e.g., single use cameras, copiers, CRT’s) are generally equipped with 
highly automated production lines [7][9], and materials cost is the key driver of the manufactur-
ing cost [20][21]. Direct Technologies estimated the manufacturing cost of air conditioners by 
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simply doubling the materials cost [22]. Furthermore, the linear cost structure enables us to 
develop a first-cut analysis and facilitates the analytic results. This functional form can be easily 
extended to other structures such as functions involving a quadratic term with respect to the 
product weight. 
Assumption 3.4 The collector is reimbursed at a rate of b ($/lb) by the manufacturer for 
used products. 
This assumption is based on the existing legislations/regulations and industrial practices. In 
California, a recycler shall pay a collector the Standard Statewide Combined Recovery Payment 
Rate (0.16 $/lb since July 1, 2008) for all covered electronic products transferred to the recycler 
[23]. In Connecticut, weight-based price is set in E-Waste laws for collectors to get reimbursed 
by manufacturers [24]. As for industrial practices, Kodak reimburses collectors $0.75/lb for the 
used single-use cameras regardless of the composition and brand [25]. Atasu et al. [13] also 
claimed that, since the WEEE recycling target is based on the product weight, cost allocation 
between manufacturers is currently weight-based, and is managed at best by sampling the col-
lected products. 
Furthermore, the economies of scale cost structure is particularly appropriate in modeling 
drop-off collection strategy. The collector invests in making customers become more aware of 
the collection program so that more customers drop off their used products at collection sites 
[26]. We also make a simplifying assumption that other operational costs of collecting activities 
are negligible. 
Assumption 3.5 Collection rate investment function )1ln()(   KC  ($) where 0K . 
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The collector invests in making customers aware of the take-back program (e.g., advertising 
and/or educational campaign) [26], and the investment is quantity-independent. Recall that the 
collection rate τ is the fraction of the sold products that are collected. One can think of τ as the 
response of customers to the investing activities. To incorporate the diminishing returns (from a 
lower to a higher τ) to investment [11], we utilize an exponential function KCe /1   where K  
is a positive scaling parameter and C  is the amount of investment. Similar response functions 
are frequently observed in advertising literature [27] characterizing customers' responsiveness 
to the advertising efforts. Hence, the investment function of the collection rate can be derived 
as in Assumption 3.5. 
Assumption 3.6 Each returned used product is recycled for the original purpose, resulting 
in a benefit of ww )(  ($/unit) where 00 a . 
 In recent years, there has been a growing emphasis on product recycling as a profitable pro-
cess to reduce materials consumption and conserve energy. Recycling process converts used 
products into raw materials and energy, and can be profitable in cases such as cell phones, 
CRT’s, and products with metal volume [9]. For instance, toner cartridge recycling is a 3 billion 
dollar industry [1]. HMR Solution claimed a nearly 100% recycling rate for CRT’s, and reused the 
recycled glass, steel, plastics, and rare materials (e.g., tin, gold and palladium) [14]. Panasonic 
also utilized the recycled glass in producing new CRT’s [3].  
Here recycling benefit is defined as the difference between the value of recycled materials 
and the recycling cost. Due to the nature of recycling process, it is reasonable to assume that 
the value of recycled materials is proportional to the product weight. As for recycling cost, Shih 
et al. [28] claimed that the recycling cost of electronic products (e.g., computers) mainly de-
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pends on the disassembly time, and estimated that the disassembly time is proportional to the 
product weight. Jeong and Lee [29] also pointed out that the recycling cost of LCD panels is 
proportional to the product weight. Furthermore, some articles claimed that the materials cost 
is the largest cost driver in e-waste recycling [30], and the recycling cost is closely allied to the 
product weight [31].  
We note that, Δ here represents the marginal recycling benefit, and will be extensively uti-
lized in the sensitivity analysis later. Also, the latter part of this assumption 00 a  implies that 
the recycling process is profitable and the recycling benefit is less than the manufacturing cost 
(due to imperfect recycling and recycling cost). 
Assumption 3.7 Linear demand function ppD  )(  where p  ($/unit) is the price and 
0,  . 
Linear demand functions are widely utilized in the supply chain [11] and economics literature 
[32] to facilitate the mathematic tractability and as a first order approximation. 
Assumption 3.8 The uncollected used products are disposed at a landfill. 
  All in all, the uncollected used products (i.e., collection leakage) will end up at landfills 
[33][34]. In this paper, we assume that the environmental impact of the supply chains is meas-
ured by the landfill quantity (i.e., the total weight of the products sent to the landfill) L, and 
)()1( pDwL  . 
Assumption 3.9 In all the models of this paper, the optimal/equilibrium decisions are inte-
rior solutions. Specifically, S 8  and 
S
Ka0  (or 
S
aK )( 0 

 for model with government 
subsidy and fee).  
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  See Appendix A for proof. by excluding pathological cases of boundary solutions, we intend to 
focus on the most relevant and interesting cases of our models. This assumption implies that 
the interiority of the optimal/equilibrium solutions can be guaranteed by a sufficiently large po-
tential market size and recycling benefit. Also, this assumption implies that S > K (according to 
Assumption 3.6). 
Given these assumptions, we now proceed to the supply chain models as follows. 
3.2.1 Non-Recycling Scenario (NR) 
  Without recycling, the collector is not considered in the NR model. Hence, the manufacturer 
decides the selling price p  and the product weight w  to maximize the profit MNR . Throughout 
this paper, ji  will denote the profit of player j  in supply chain scenario i . 
                           (3.1)                                                                      )/ln())((  max 00
,
wwSwappMNR
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3.2.2 Centralized Supply Chain with Recycling (CR) 
In the CR model, we assume that the manufacturer and the collector are vertically integrat-
ed, and all the decisions are made by a central planner with the objective of maximizing total 
supply chain profit. Centralized models have been extensively utilized as a benchmark against 
decentralized models for the comparative studies of economic factors such as price and profit, 
as well as environmental factors such as collection rate [13]. The relevant decision variables for 
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the central planner are the selling price p , the product weight w , and the collection rate  . The 
profit maximization problem is 
(3.2)                                                )/ln()1ln(])([ )(  max 00
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3.2.3 Decentralized Supply Chain with Recycling (DR) 
  In the DR model, we assume that the manufacturer is the leader and the collector is the fol-
lower in a Stackelberg game. The assumption of a dominant manufacturer is frequently ob-
served in supply chain literature and is based on the belief that downstream supply chain 
members such as collectors are often smaller in size and operate in specific local markets [40]. 
Also, we are assuming that the core competence of the manufacturer is not in collecting the 
used products [11][26]. Hence, given the selling price and the product weight, the collector op-
timally determines the collection rate via 
                            (3.3)                                                                           )1ln()(  max 

 KpbwCDR  
The best response function is 
)(
1),,(*
pbw
K
bwp



 . Considering the collector's best response, 
the manufacturer optimally determines the selling price, the product weight, and the buyback 
price via 
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The manufacturer's equilibrium solutions are 
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3.2.4 Decentralized Supply Chain with Recycling and Government Subsidy/Fee (DR-G) 
The supply chain scenario of the DR-G model is exactly the same as the DR model except that 
we are considering the government participation in the form of subsidy and fee (see Figure 2). 
Assumption 3.10 In the DR-G model, under the framework of revenue-neutrality, the gov-
ernment provides a subsidy of σ ($/lb) to the collector for the collecting of used products, and 
receives a fee of α ($/lb) from the manufacturer for the products sold. 
Materials Flow
Government 
Subsidy and 
Fee Flow
Government
Production Fee
αwD(p)
Collection Subsidy
σwτD(p)
Manufacturer
Collector
Collection
τD(p) Landfill
(1 - τ)D(p)
Customers
Sales
D(p)
Take Back
τD(p)
 
Figure 2. Decentralized Supply Chain with Government Subsidy and Fee 
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In California, collectors are subsidized $0.2/lb for the collection of used video display devices 
[35]. In Nebraska, manufacturers are responsible to pay the State Agency of Natural Resources 
$0.5/lb for the covered electronic devices based on annual statewide sales [36]. By revenue-
neutrality, we mean that the financial gains from fees balance the financial expenses of subsi-
dies so that government is financially neutral (i.e., )()( pwDpwD   ). A revenue-neutral carbon 
tax has been implemented in British Columbia since 2008, and the tax revenue will be returned 
through tax reductions [37]. In the literature, Palmer and Walls [38] utilized a tax/subsidy com-
bination in which producers pay a per-pound tax and collectors of used products receive a per-
pound subsidy. Furthermore, Mrozek [39] argued that the deposit/refund systems must be im-
plemented in a way that the revenue is neutral to achieve the maximum efficiency. The entire 
operation of DR-G model is depicted in Figure 2. 
Given the selling price and collection rate, the collector optimally determines the collection 
rate via 
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response function, we have 
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Based on the optimal/equilibrium solutions summarized in Table 1, we performed the sensi-
tivity analysis based on marginal recycling benefit and collecting subsidy, as well as comparison 
analysis among three CLSC scenarios. Recycling benefit is the critical driver of recycling profita-
bility [12], and accordingly, is the economic motivation behind the manufacturer’s recycling in-
vestment and collector’s take back investment [11][13]. 
Proposition 3.1 NRCR   and NR
M
DR  . 
  See Appendix B for proof. If SKa /0 , the value of recycled materials will not cover the take 
back cost and the recycling cost. Also, if SKa /0 , the manufacturer's profits in the DR model 
and the total supply chain profit in the CR model are greater than the manufacturer's profit in 
the NR model.  
Proposition 3.2  In the DR model,  
wDR 0

 , 0

 DR . 
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  See Appendix C for proof. This proposition states that the increase (decrease) of the marginal 
recycling benefit   will result in both higher (lower) levels of product weight and collection rate 
(see Figure 3 based on numerical examples).  
 
 
Figure 3. Variation of Production Weight and Collection Rate with Marginal Recycling Benefit 
Intuitively, as   increases, there is an incentive for the manufacturer to pursue a higher level 
of the collection rate so as to gain more benefits from recycling process. Hence, the manufac-
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turer incentivizes the collector to take back more products via increasing the buyback price and 
reduce the investment in the product weight reduction. Hence, decision makers may not be 
able to pursue both higher level of the collection rate and lower level of the product weight 
simultaneously, and it is advised to examine the negative impact on the other factor before any 
efforts on improving one environmental factor.  
Proposition 3.3 In the DR model, 0

 DRL  if 
KS
Sa
S
Ka


2
00 , and 0

 DRL  if 
KS
Sa


2
0 . 
See Appendix D for proof. This proposition indicates that, if the marginal recycling benefit is 
relatively low, the landfill quantity decreases with the marginal recycling benefit, and if the 
marginal recycling benefit is relatively high, the landfill quantity increases with the marginal re-
cycling benefit (see Figure 4 based on numerical examples).  
 
Figure 4. Variation of the Landfill Quantity with Marginal Recycling Benefit 
Intuitively, when the marginal recycling benefit is relatively high, both the product weight 
and the collection rate are also relatively high (see Proposition 3.2). Accordingly, the effect of 
diminishing returns to the collection investment dominates that of the product weight reduc-
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tion investment. As a result, the marginal increase of the product weight with respect to   
dominates the marginal increase of the collection rate with respect to   (which can be ob-
served in Figure 3), which leads to a higher level of the landfill quantity. In this sense, the in-
crease of the marginal recycling benefit may not always favor the reduction of landfill quantity, 
and hence, should not be encouraged unconditionally. This probably unintended consequence 
implies that the decision makers must view the critical environmental factors in totality before 
any effort to improve a particular set of environmental factors. 
Proposition 3.4 In the NR, CR, and DR models, given the same values of parameters, the 
product weight, the collection rate, and the landfill quantity are related as follows:  
CRDRNR www  , CRDR   , CRDRNR LLL   
See Appendix E for proof. This proposition demonstrates that the centralized model domi-
nates the decentralized model in terms of higher collection rate and lower landfill quantity due 
to its ability to coordinate and avoid double marginalization [11]. This is because the central 
planner can improve the collection rate by coordinating the forward and reverse channel deci-
sions via a single two-part tariff [11]. However, due to the inherent conflict between the in-
vestments in product weight reduction and collection rate enhancement, centralization also 
results in a higher product weight relative to the decentralization case (see Figure 3). Moreover, 
product recycling is always beneficial to lessening the environmental burdens in terms of less 
landfill quantity. 
  Thus far we have examined the key insights and implications of the supply chain models with-
out government intervention. Let us proceed to examine such insights and implications of the 
supply chain models with government intervention. 
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Proposition 3.5 In the DR-G model,  0- 



GDRw , 0- 



 GDR . 
  See Appendix F for proof. Similar to Proposition 3.2, this proposition states that the increase 
(decrease) of the collecting subsidy   will result in both higher (lower) levels of product weight 
and collection rate. Intuitively, as   increases, there is an incentive for the collector to pursue a 
higher level of the collection rate so as to gain more benefits from recycling process. From the 
manufacturer's perspective, with a higher level of the returned quantity, there is an incentive to 
reduce the investment in product weight reduction so as to take more advantage of the recy-
cling benefit. 
Given this knowledge, policy makers should be aware of both positive and negative conse-
quences on the environmental factors before implementing the subsidy and fee. Furthermore, 
it is extremely desirable to investigate the corresponding environmental consequence involving 
these two factors. 
Proposition 3.6 In the DR-G model, 0- 



GDRL  if 



KS
aS
2
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

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2
)( 0   
See Appendix G for proof. Similar to Proposition 3.3, this proposition indicates that, if the col-
lecting subsidy is relatively low, the landfill quantity decreases with the collecting subsidy, and if 
the collecting subsidy is relatively high, the landfill quantity increases with the collecting subsidy 
(see Figure 5 based on numerical examples). In this sense, the increase of the collecting subsidy 
may not always favor the reduction of landfill quantity, and hence, should not be encouraged 
unconditionally. We refer the readers to the illustration of Proposition 3.3 for the essential ide-
as of the intuition of this proposition.  
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This proposition implies that, to avoid unintended consequences, policy makers must view 
the critical environmental factors in totality before any financial instrument encouraging a par-
ticular set of the environmental factor(s).  
Due to the similarity between the DR and DR-G model, it is desirable to compare them in 
terms of the product weight, collection rate, and landfill quantity. Meanwhile, the CR model is 
also utilized as a benchmark to investigate whether and how the environmental performance in 
the centralized model can be achieved in the decentralized model. 
Proposition 3.7 In the DR and DR-G model, given the same values of parameters, the 
product weight and the collection rate are related as follows: GDRDR ww - , GDRDR -  . 
See Appendix H for proof. This proposition demonstrates that, government participation in 
the form of collection subsidy and production fee will result in both higher levels of the product 
weight and the collection rate. This implies that incentives for product collection also discour-
age manufacturer’s efforts on product weight reduction, which may not be the original inten-
tion of policy makers. In this sense, it is interesting to further compare the total environmental 
consequence in terms of the landfill quantity. 
Proposition 3.8 In the DR-G model,  
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See Appendix I for proof. Proposition 3.8 demonstrates the significance of the subsidy on the 
total environmental impact under the revenue-neutrality framework. Specifically, by choosing 
an appropriate value of subsidy, the landfill quantity in the centralized model can be achieved 
or even further reduced in the decentralized model (see Figure 5). Nevertheless, on the other 
hand, a sufficiently high value of the subsidy may also result in a higher level of the landfill 
quantity relative to the non-subsidy case (see Figure 5). This implies that implementing a subsi-
dy/fee instrument into the CLSC’s may not always be environmentally viable. Given these find-
ings, the pricing of subsidy/fee becomes important, and it is highly advised to examine the 
whole supply chain information before any financial instrument is offered so as to realize high 
environmental efficiency (less landfill quantity) and avoid unintended negative environmental 
consequences (more landfill quantity). 
 
Figure 5. Variation of the Landfill Quantity with the Collecting Subsidy 
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Furthermore, we note that the selling prices in the decentralized models are identical to the 
selling price in the centralized model. This is because there is no double-marginalization in the 
forward supply chain when the manufacturer directly sells the products to customers. 
3.3 Managerial Insights and Policy Implications 
The analytic results in this paper demonstrate that: (i) There is an inherent conflict between 
product weight reduction and collection rate improvement. That is, conditions (e.g., increase in 
the marginal recycling benefit) leading to a higher level of the collection rate may also result in 
a higher level of the product weight. (ii) As a result, efforts on improving one environmental 
factor may negatively impact the other factor, which, in some cases, will result in an unintend-
ed higher level of the landfill quantity. In other words, under certain conditions, the environ-
ment is worse off as product recycling becomes more attractive. In this sense, decision makers 
are advised to view the impacts on both environmental factors as a whole and examine the to-
tal environmental consequence before any efforts. (iii) Meanwhile, a policy maker is advised to 
be cautious when implementing a subsidy/fee mechanism to CLSC’s under the framework of 
revenue-neutrality (i.e., subsidies balance fees). For example, if the subsidy is sufficiently high, 
the CLSC with subsidy/fee may be inferior to the non-subsidy/fee case with respect to the land-
fill quantity. Hence, the pricing of subsidy/fee becomes critically important to achieve high envi-
ronmental efficiency and avoid any unintended negative environmental consequences. 
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CHAPTER 4 
REMANUFACTURING DECISION WITH REMANUFACTURING COST UNCERTAINTY 
4.1 Background and Objectives 
Among the existing sustainable processes for end-of-life products, remanufacturing provides 
an opportunity for firms from various industries to mitigate the environmental impacts while 
maintaining economic viability. From decision/policy makers’ perspective, there are substantial 
opportunities to reap the economic and environmental benefits of the remanufacturing, such 
as reverse supply chain designs and acquisition strategies. Among these opportunities, remanu-
facturing timing is especially important for firms providing services or leasing products [30] in 
the sense that the product life is determined by internal process management and/or leasing 
contracts. We note that, for this product life, the physical condition (e.g., component abrasion) 
deteriorates over time on average, which complicates the decision making process on remanu-
facturing timing. This is supported by the evidence that the quality of returned products to 
manufacturers in general varies vastly [31]. 
With this knowledge, it is highly desirable to understand the economically rational decisions 
on the remanufacturing timing under remanufacturing cost uncertainties. Furthermore, for pol-
icy makers, especially in the areas of governmental subsidies and fees, it is critical to under-
stand how appropriate policies could influence the remanufacturing decisions so as to reduce 
the environmental impacts.  
In this chapter, we consider a firm that leases a single product to a service provider, and the 
firm is also responsible for the maintenance of the product. For instance, Xerox leases photo-
copiers to Staples which provides copying services to customers. Throughout a product's lifecy-
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cle, as the maintenance cost increases (due to component-deterioration), at any time point, the 
firm has an option to terminate the life of the product and remanufacture it. During the reman-
ufacturing process, depending on the physical condition, components are either reused or re-
placed and disposed. After the remanufacturing process, the product is restored to a like-new 
condition and re-leased to the service provider.  
We note that the flexibility on remanufacturing described above lends itself to a real options 
approach. That is, the firm has the right, but not the obligation, to make changes to its business 
project under uncertainty [41]. Moreover, in the extended scenario, government participation 
is incorporated into our model in the form of remanufacturing subsidy and disposal fee. Under 
these modeling frameworks, this study attempts to  
(1) Formulate and analyze mathematical models of the remanufacturing decision from a real 
options perspective when the remanufacturing cost follows a Geometric Brownian motion 
(GBM) process. 
(2) Provide managerial insights by examining how the remanufacturing cost uncertainty and 
other relevant factors influence the exercise of the remanufacturing option. 
(3) Derive policy implications by examining the impacts of the remanufacturing subsidy and dis-
posal fee on the firm's remanufacturing decision as well as on the environment. 
(4) Provide guidelines for the government regarding how policies should be adjusted in re-
sponse to the variation of remanufacturing cost uncertainty so as to mitigate the environ-
mental impacts. 
To our knowledge, what distinguishes this article from the extant literature is that (i) this is 
the first quantitative study investigating the economic rationale of remanufacturing decision 
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from a real options perspective; (ii) the product life and the reuse/disposal fraction are consid-
ered simultaneously, with the objective of examining the environmental impacts resulting from 
the remanufacturing decision; (iii) the viability of governmental policies is measured by envi-
ronmental performances instead of total surplus. 
The critical findings of this paper include: (i) The uncertainty of remanufacturing cost is the 
driver for decision makers to prolong the product life and defer the exercise of remanufacturing 
option because the uncertainty increases the value of holding the flexibility; (ii) Increasing the 
remanufacturing subsidy (disposal fee) incentivizes decision makers to exercise the remanufac-
turing option earlier (later) because the subsidy reduces (increases) the cost of exercising the 
option now. That is, the value of waiting is diminished; (iii) An increase of the remanufacturing 
subsidy (disposal fee) may result in more industrial wastes because it entails a shorter product 
life (lower reuse fraction of materials); (iv) As the remanufacturing cost becomes more uncer-
tain, the policy maker is advised to increase the remanufacturing subsidy or decrease the dis-
posal fee because these adjustments balance the higher level of landfill disposal stemmed from 
the higher uncertainty.  We hope that these findings, as the first research findings on the re-
manufacturing decisions via a real options approach will stimulate relevant discussions among 
industrial practitioners, governmental regulators, environmental groups, as well as academics. 
4.2 Models and Analyses 
4.2.1 Basic Model 
In this section, let us consider a firm that leases a product to a service provider, and then the 
service provider utilizes the services derived from the product to serve customers. Meanwhile, 
the firm provides the maintenance service for the product to preserve the product in a reliable 
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operating condition. Such leasing and maintenance contracts exist in a variety of industries, 
such as photocopier leasing contract between Xerox and Staples as well as mail processing ma-
chine leasing contracts between Pitney Bowes and USPS. Furthermore, the firm has an option 
to terminate the life of the product and remanufacture it. The product is restored to like-new 
condition during the remanufacturing process, and re-leased to the service provider. Prior to 
modeling the remanufacturing decision process, we will first provide the key assumptions of 
our models. 
Assumption 4.1 The remanufacturing period is assumed to be negligible.  
This simplifying assumption is made to focus on the remanufacturing decision without dilut-
ing our attention to various transient issues such as how to model the behavior of the manufac-
turer as well as the service provider during the remanufacturing [42].  
Assumption 4.2 There exists a leasing contract between the firm and the service provider 
with a leasing price of P ($/unit product) at any time point. By this contract, the firm is responsi-
ble for the maintenance of the product to preserve it in a reliable operating condition. The con-
tract term is sufficiently long that the expiration of the contract is not considered in the models. 
Assumption 4.3 The remanufacturing cost C ($/unit product), at any time point, follows a 
GBM process, i.e., CdzCdtdC    where 0 ,  . Here   and   are the instantaneous growth rate 
(%/unit time) and volatility, respectively. dz  is the increment of a standard Wiener process (
dtdz t  where t ~ )1,0(N ). Furthermore, at the beginning of the product life, the remanufactur-
ing cost is positive, denoted by 0C . 
Technically, we note that the source of cost uncertainty in this paper is the volatility of GBM 
process. Remanufacturing is a process of restoring the end-of-life products to like-new condi-
35 
 
tion by replacing the parts that are affecting the performance of the whole product [44]. At the 
beginning of the process, for each component, the reuse potential is assessed based on the 
component's overall life and the used life under the operating conditions [45]. Typically, in a 
product's lifecycle, the components subject to quality deterioration over time (i.e., functioning 
less efficiently than that at the beginning of the product life) [46]. For example, in photocopier, 
the abrasion of fast moving parts such as bushings is sensitive to the operating life [47]. There-
fore, on average, the longer time a product is being operated before remanufacturing, the 
more components subject to replacement, which implies a higher remanufacturing cost.  
Meanwhile, service demand (units of service/unit time) following a stochastic process in 
general and a GBM process in particular can be observed in the literature [48][49]. By a unit 
service, we mean a quantifiable measure of service such as a single paper copy in Staples or a 
load of clothes in a laundry. Hence, being sensitive to the serving frequency, the deterioration 
of components and product as a whole are stochastic with respect to the operating time [50].  
As a classical stochastic process with deterministic growth rate, GBM process is utilized in 
our models to characterize the variation of remanufacturing cost over operating time while fa-
cilitating the analytical investigation of the models. We note that modeling cost factor as a GBM 
process is not new [51][52]. Furthermore, Zambujal-Oliveira and Duque [53] modeled the sal-
vage value of end-of-life products as a GBM process where the salvage value can be roughly 
interpreted as the remanufacturing cost saving (i.e., the cost difference between manufacturing 
a new product and remanufacturing a used product) [11]. Therefore, the remanufacturing cost 
uncertainty could also result from the fluctuation of market price for raw materials or compo-
nents that are replaced in the remanufacturing process, which is widely modeled as a GBM pro-
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cess in the literature. We also note that the remanufacturing cost may decrease because the 
prices for the components that are replaced during the remanufacturing process may drops. 
Furthermore, we assume a positive remanufacturing cost at the beginning of the product life 
to avoid the trivial solution of exercising remanufacturing option without operating the prod-
uct. This positive value can interpreted as the costs associated with cleaning, testing, and disas-
sembly procedures [54]. 
Assumption 4.4 By the leasing contract, the firm is responsible for maintaining the prod-
uct in a reliable operating condition. At any time point, the maintenance cost M ($/unit product) 
is proportional to the instantaneous remanufacturing cost, i.e., CCM )(  where 10  . 
The constant term in M(C) is not presented because, mathematically, any constant term can 
be incorporated into the leasing price without affecting the analytical results. Finally, 10   
avoids the trivial solution of exercising the option at the beginning of the product life.  
Assumption 4.5 The number of products leased to service providers is sufficiently large so 
that the capital cost involved in remanufacturing process such as equipment cost is negligible 
for each product. 
Without considering the economies of scale for product transportation and installation, the 
decision process for the remanufacturing of each product is independent. Therefore, even 
though our models are based on a single product, they can be easily extended to multi-product 
models without affecting any analytical result. In this sense, as long as the number of products 
is large enough, the lump sum capital cost for each product is negligible compared to the re-
manufacturing cost, and hence, has negligible impact on the exercising of remanufacturing op-
tion. Furthermore, we assume that the cost of acquiring remanufacturing option is negligible. In 
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certain systems with small amount of inputs such as excavator remanufacturing at Case New 
Holland where equipment cost cannot be ignored, decision makers can compare this cost to the 
value of the remanufacturing option to decide whether or not it is optimal to acquire this flexi-
bility. 
Given these assumptions, the remanufacturing decision can be interpreted as an optimal 
stopping problem. For a single product, at any time point, the decision maker measures the re-
manufacturing cost and the net present value of the leasing project (will be referred as project 
value hereafter) to decide whether or not to exercise the remanufacturing option. The project 
value is defined as the sum of the discounted expected cash flow and the value of the remanu-
facturing option (or the value of flexibility).  
Since the leasing price is fixed and the maintenance cost increases with time (Assumption 
3.4), the project value decreases as product ages. Also, the remanufacturing cost increases with 
time. However, the project value tends to decrease faster than the remanufacturing cost be-
cause the increase of maintenance cost has a cumulative impact on the project value deprecia-
tion over time. Furthermore, through remanufacturing, a product is restored to like-new condi-
tion, and accordingly, the maintenance cost is restored to the lowest level (i.e., 0)( CCM  ). There-
fore, at certain time point, the remanufacturing cost balances the difference between the origi-
nal project value (at the beginning of the product life with the lowest maintenance cost) and 
the instantaneous project value. Therefore, the remanufacturing cost at that time point be-
comes the threshold above which it is optimal to exercise the option. Furthermore, since a 
product is re-leased to the service provider after remanufacturing, there are infinite remanufac-
turing options with a common remanufacturing cost threshold to exercise. Without loss of gen-
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erality, in this study, we target to resolve the problem with single remanufacturing option. As 
long as the remanufacturing option is not exercised, the project value V must satisfy the follow-
ing Bellman's equation [59]. 
    (4.1)                                                                            ]|[)( CdVEdtCPVdt    
where ρ is the discount rate per unit time, and E[] is the operator of expectation value. The left-
hand side of (4.1) is the return per unit time for holding the remanufacturing option. On the 
right-hand side, the first term is the immediate profit from holding the remanufacturing option, 
while the second term is the expected depreciation of the project value. 
By Ito's Lemma [59], it can be verified that 
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Substituting equation (4.2) into equation (4.1), we have 
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To guarantee the convergence of the differential equation (4.3), we impose that   . Also, 
it can be verified that the project value function is given by (see Appendix J for proof) 
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In equation (4.4), the first term is the value of the remanufacturing option, and the second 
(third) term is the discounted expected cost (revenue) flow. It can be observed that option val-
ue increases with the remanufacturing cost, and the discounted cash flow decreases with the 
remanufacturing cost.  
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Suppose CR represents the remanufacturing cost threshold, then the project value function 
satisfies the following boundary conditions [59]. 
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Equation (4.5) is the value-matching condition and equation (4.6) is the smooth-pasting con-
dition. The value-matching condition requires that, at the remanufacturing cost threshold, the 
expected value of an existing unit equals the expected NPV of a remanufactured one plus the 
value of embedded remanufacturing option. The smooth-pasting condition assures that CR is 
the optimal exercise point by defining the continuance and smoothness of V(C) at CR. 
Proposition 4.1 There exists a unique solution for the remanufacturing cost threshold CR. 
See Appendix K for proof. Even though there is no explicit closed-form solution for CR, the 
following propositions can be derived by implicit function theorem. 
Proposition 4.2 Given  0 , 0



RC   and  0
0



C
CR . 
See Appendix L for proof. The interpretation of this proposition is given as follows: 0/  RC  
indicates that an increase in the volatility leads to an increase in the remanufacturing cost 
threshold. This is because, as the volatility increases, the value of the remanufacturing option 
also increases, and hence, it is more beneficial to hold the option for a higher remanufacturing 
cost. 0/ 0  CCR  indicates that, as the fixed cost (i.e., associated with cleaning, testing, and dis-
assembly) increases, the remanufacturing cost threshold increases. This is because a higher 
fixed cost decreases the new project value after remanufacturing, which incentivizes the firm to 
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defer the exercise of the remanufacturing option and wait for a higher remanufacturing cost 
threshold..  
Thus far, we have performed analysis for the remanufacturing cost surrounding the remanu-
facturing decision. We now proceed to derive the expected life of the product. Suppose CCF ln)( 
, by Ito's lemma, 
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For any finite time period T, the change in )(CF  is normally distributed with a mean of 
T)2/( 2   and a variance of T2 . Hence, the expected passage time from 0C  to RC  is 
)2//()ln(ln 20   CCT R . It can be observed that the variation of expected product life with the 
remanufacturing cost volatility depends on the parameter values [43]. Specifically, if 2/2  , 
the expected life of the product increases with the remanufacturing cost volatility (i.e., 
0/  T ); if 2/2  , the expected product life decreases with the remanufacturing cost vola-
tility (i.e., 0/  T ). 
4.2.2 Extended Model with Remanufacturing Subsidy and Disposal Fee 
In this subsection, we extend the basic model by incorporating government economic in-
struments in the form of remanufacturing subsidy and disposal fee as detailed in the following 
two assumptions. 
Assumption 4.6    There exists a subsidy S ($/unit product) for the remanufacturing of end-of-life 
products. 
In recent years, the usage of subsidies as an economic instrument to facilitate the remanu-
facturing of end-of-life products has significantly increased at all of local, state, and national 
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levels. For example, in California, remanufacturers are subsidized $0.28/lb for remanufacturing 
electronic products. In New York, the remanufacturers receive tax credits that are commensu-
rate with the number of employees and/or the durability of capital investment. However, criti-
cal questions such as whether the existing subsidies are environmentally viable and how to best 
utilize these incentives to minimize the environmental impacts are rarely answered in academic 
articles or government reports. Therefore, to examine the environmental viability of the re-
manufacturing subsidy, we assume that such a subsidy will be reimbursed to the firm once the 
remanufacturing option is exercised. 
Assumption 4.7  The weight of a unit product is W (lb). In the remanufacturing process, for 
a unit product, )(Cd  fraction (in weight) of the materials is disposed at a disposal fee of L ($/lb), 
the rest )(1 Cd  fraction (in weight) of materials is reused.  
Here d(C) is defined as the disposal fraction, and 1–d(C) is defined as the reuse fraction. Dur-
ing the remanufacturing process, the non-reusable components are disposed at landfill with a 
disposal fee [44]. Nowadays, both public and private landfills exist in the waste management 
market. While private landfills are profit-driven, public landfills are operated by local govern-
ments with the primary goal of reducing the landfill disposal, which entails a higher disposal fee 
relative to the private landfills [60]. However, our analytical results demonstrate that, a higher 
disposal fee may not result in less amount of wastes end up at landfill. This ramification cannot 
be the original intention of policy makers. Therefore, similar economic instruments should be 
carefully examined before implemention. 
By this assumption, given the expected product life T, we are able to define the expected 
weight of disposal per unit time (will be referred as disposal rate hereafter), denoted by Q , as 
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Equivalently, Q  can be interpreted as the weight of material consumption per unit time. 
Throughout this paper, Q will be utilized as a critical measurement of the environmental im-
pacts. By Assumptions 4.6 & 4.7, we have the new value-matching and smooth pasting condi-
tions as follows. 
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Assumption 4.8    The disposal fraction is linear to the remanufacturing cost, i.e., 
00 )()( dCCCd   . 
The disposal fraction is determined by the amount of worn-out components that are re-
placed in the remanufacturing process. C – C0  represents the component-replacement cost in 
the remanufacturing process where C0 represents the costs associated with cleaning, testing, 
and disassembly procedures. Moreover, term d0 is associated with the parts that are mandated 
to be replaced in the remanufacturing process regardless of the physical conditions, such as 
packages and covers. For example, in the remanufacturing process of photocopies, plastic co-
vers are mandated to be replaced with new ones in case that the crack on the old covers would 
affect the quality of the copy works [61].  
We acknowledge that the weight of disposed materials may not be perfectly linear to the 
remanufacturing cost. However, this simplifying assumption facilitates the tractability of the 
analysis, and can be observed in the literature [62]. Given this assumption, in what follows, we 
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will provide a series of propositions characterizing the impacts of remanufacturing subsidy and 
disposal fee on the remanufacturing decision and the environment. 
Proposition 4.3 Given  0 , 0


S
CR , 0


L
CR , 0


S
T
, and 0


L
T
. 
See Appendix M for proof. The interpretations of 0/  SCR  and 0/  ST  are straightforward. 
As the remanufacturing subsidy increases, the cost of exercising the remanufacturing option 
decreases, which incentivizes the firm to exercise the option earlier. Accordingly, the remanu-
facturing cost threshold CR becomes lower and the expected life T  becomes shorter. As for 
0/  LCR  and 0/  LT , the increase of disposal fee implies a higher cost of exercising the op-
tion, resulting in a deference of remanufacturing. 
In addition to the economic impacts on the firm's remanufacturing decision, from an envi-
ronmental perspective, the remanufacturing subsidy and the disposal fee are influencing the 
disposal rate from two aspects: (i) an increase of the remanufacturing subsidy (disposal fee) will 
shorten (lengthen) the product life; on the other hand, (ii) a shorter (longer) product life will in 
turn result in a lower (higher) disposal fraction. In this sense, the overall impacts are far away 
from simple and straightforward, as presented in the following two propositions. 
Proposition 4.4 Given  0 , 0
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 0)()ln(ln 000  dCCCCC  . 
See Appendix N for proof. This proposition indicates that, if the remanufacturing subsidy is 
relatively low (high), an increase of the subsidy will result in a lower (higher) level of the dispos-
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al rate. Also, S* represents the optimal remanufacturing subsidy that will lead to the minimum 
disposal rate. 
The intuitive interpretation of this proposition is as follows. A high remanufacturing subsidy 
implies a low remanufacturing cost threshold (Proposition 4.3), which in turn results in a low 
disposal fraction (Assumption 4.8). In this case, the major constituents of the disposed materi-
als come from components that are replaced regardless of the operating life such as plastic co-
vers in copiers (i.e., term d0 in Assumption 4.8). Therefore, the increase of the subsidy becomes 
less helpful in reducing the disposal fraction. Meanwhile, a higher subsidy does result in a 
shorter product life (i.e., more frequent disposal). Therefore, in totality, when increases the 
subsidy at a high level, the increase of the disposal frequency dominates the decrease of dis-
posal fraction, which results in a higher disposal rate (i.e., weight of disposed materials per unit 
time). Therefore, the increase of the remanufacturing subsidy does not always lead to less envi-
ronmental impact, and hence, should not be advocated unconditionally. 
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See Appendix O for proof. This proposition indicates that, if the disposal fee is relatively low 
(high), an increase of the disposal fee will result in a lower (higher) disposal rate. Also, L* repre-
sents the optimal disposal fee that will lead to the minimum disposal rate. 
Intuitively, a high disposal fee implies a long product life (Proposition 4.3), which in turn im-
plies a high maintenance cost (Assumption 4.4). Therefore, due the cumulative impact of 
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maintenance cost on project value, the increase of disposal fee becomes less helpful in increas-
ing the product life (i.e., lower disposal frequency). Meanwhile, a higher disposal fee does re-
sult in a higher disposal fraction (Proposition 4.3 and Assumption 4.8). Therefore, in totality, 
when increases the disposal fee at a high level, the increase of the disposal fraction dominates 
the decrease of the disposal frequency, which results in a higher disposal rate. This ramification 
implies that increasing disposal fee may not always prevent wastes from being dumped at land-
fill, and should be implemented more carefully. 
Proposition 4.6 Given  0 , 0
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L
. 
See Appendix P for proof. This proposition indicates that, as the remanufacturing cost vola-
tility increases, the optimal remanufacturing subsidy increases and the optimal disposal fee de-
creases. Hence, when observing higher volatility in remanufacturing cost from industries, policy 
makers are advised to either increase the remanufacturing subsidy or decrease the disposal fee 
so as to maintain the minimum environmental impact. The intuition behind this proposition is 
as follows. Since a higher volatility in remanufacturing cost incentivizes the decision maker to 
defer the remanufacturing option, the policy maker needs to adjust the subsidy/fee reversely 
so as to balance the deference caused by the higher volatility. Therefore, by Proposition 4.3, 
the policy maker should reduce the exercising cost of the option by either increasing the re-
manufacturing subsidy or decreasing the disposal fee. This proposition provides a guideline for 
policy makers regarding how economic instruments should be adjusted in response to the vola-
tility change in remanufacturing industries. 
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4.3 Numerical Study 
In this section, utilizing the remanufacturing of photocopier as an example, we numerically 
illustrate the key features of our analytical findings in the previous section. Photocopier reman-
ufacturing is one of the most mature and widely implemented remanufacturing processes in 
practice. Xerox has developed a remanufacturing system since late 1980s to maximize the prof-
itability of operations, and saved millions of dollars in raw materials and disposal costs [33]. At 
the same time, photocopier is also widely utilized by firms such as Staples to provide services to 
customers. Now, let us first present the parameter values used in this study. Even though the 
values are hypothetical, we have consulted the local Staples Managers as well as others [16]-
[18]. These values are summarized in Table 1, and the corresponding numerical results are giv-
en in Table 2.  
Table 1. Parameters and Values 
Parameters Values 
Leasing Price  P ($/year)  (see Assumption 4.2) 800 
Cleaning, Testing, and Disassembly Cost  C0  ($/unit product) (see Assumption 4.3) 250 
Annual Discount Rate  ρ 0.10 
Annualized Growth Rate of Remanufacturing Cost    (see Assumption 4.3) 0.08 
Annualized Volatility of Remanufacturing Cost  σ  (see Assumption 4.3) 0.04 
Product Weight  W  (lb)  (see Assumption 4.7) 300 
Remanufacturing Subsidy  S  ($/unit product)  (see Assumption 4.6) 30  
Disposal Fee  L  ($/lb)  (see Assumption 4.7) 0.03 
Maintenance Cost Function Coefficient  α  (see Assumption 4.4) 0.3 
Disposal Fraction Function Coefficient    (%/$) (see Assumption 4.8) 0.5 
Disposal Fraction Function Coefficient  d0  (see Assumption 4.8)  10% 
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Table 2. Numerical Results Relevant to the Remanufacturing Decision 
Variables Values 
1A  8.98 
1  1.25 
Remanufacturing Cost Threshold CR  ($/unit product) 361.93 
Product Life (year) 4.67 
Disposal Fraction )(Cd  65.97% 
Disposal Rate  Q  (lb/year) 41.93 
Optimal Remanufacturing Subsidy  S  ($/unit product) 44.47 
Optimal Disposal Fee  L  ($/lb) 0.04 
Project Value at the beginning of the Product Life V(C0)  ($) 16,435 
Project Value at the end of the Product Life V(CR) ($) 16,073 
  
 
Figure 6. Project Value vs. Remanufacturing Cost 
Figure 6 shows the value of the project with respect to the remanufacturing cost. It can be 
observed that, as the remanufacturing cost increases, the currently operating project value de-
creases. When the sum of the current project value and the remanufacturing cost (blue solid 
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line) equals to the new project value (red dashed line), it is optimal to remanufacture the prod-
uct. The intersection of the blue line and the red line characterizes the value-matching and 
smooth-pasting condition at the remanufacturing cost threshold. Figure 7 shows the variation 
of the remanufacturing cost threshold with the remanufacturing cost volatility and the fixed 
cost (e.g., cleaning, testing, and disassembly). The numerical results are consistent with the 
analytical results given in Proposition 4.2.  
 
Figure 7. Variation of Remanufacturing Cost Threshold with Volatility and Fixed Cost 
Figure 8 shows the variation of the disposal rate with the remanufacturing subsidy and the 
disposal fee, which is also consistent with the analytical results presented in Proposition 4.4 & 
4.5. Moreover, Figure 9 shows the variation of the optimal remanufacturing subsidy and the 
optimal disposal fee with the remanufacturing cost volatility, and the numerical results align 
with the analytical conclusion presented in Proposition 4.6. 
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Figure 8. Variation of Reuse Fraction, Product Life, and Disposal Rate with S and L 
 
Figure 9. Variation of Optimal Remanufacturing Subsidy and Disposal Fee with Volatility 
Thus far, we have performed the numerical analysis for the firm's remanufacturing decision 
based on fixed hypothetical data. Now, in contrast, Monte Carlo method is utilized to simulate 
the sample paths given 2500 C ($/unit) as the starting point and the GBM process as 
CdzCdtdC 04.008.0  .  
Given the parameters as indicated before, the GBM paths were generated 10,000 times by 
MATLAB, and the mean product life was 4.89 years with 95% confidence interval (4.64, 5.14), 
which is fairly close to the expected product life of 4.67 years obtained earlier this section. Here 
the confidence interval comes from standard procedure like [84][85][89]. Furthermore, two 
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typical sample paths with same growth rate (0.08) and different volatility (0.04 and 0.06) are 
given in Figure 10 (sample path with volatility 0.04 in blue and sample path with volatility 0.06 
in red). It can be observed that, the remanufacturing threshold increases with a higher volatili-
ty, which induces decision makers to hold the option for a longer time. Intuitively, after reach-
ing $361.93 (i.e., the remanufacturing threshold in the low-volatility case) for the first time 
around the 5th year, the high-volatility sample path falls below $361.93 several times. Hence, 
with a higher volatility, it is advised to defer the exercise of the remanufacturing option. This 
observation aligns with our previous statement that, with a higher volatility, there is a greater 
chance of a reduction in the remanufacturing cost in the near future. 
 
Figure 10. Sample Paths of the Remanufacturing Cost in 8 Years 
4.4 Managerial Insights and Policy Implications 
A higher remanufacturing cost volatility entails a higher remanufacturing cost threshold. This 
finding implies that the remanufacturing cost uncertainty is the driver for the decision maker to 
defer the exercise of the remanufacturing option. Therefore, any factor that will cause uncer-
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tainty in remanufacturing cost directly or indirectly should be carefully examined. For example, 
if the market prices of the product components tend to fluctuate more intensively, or the ser-
vice demand becomes more unpredictable (resulting in uncertainty in operating frequency and 
component deterioration accordingly), it is advised that the decision maker should wait for a 
higher remanufacturing cost threshold to exercise the remanufacturing option. Furthermore, if 
there is any external incentive (penalty) for product remanufacturing, exercising the remanu-
facturing option at a lower remanufacturing cost is recommended.  
From government's perspective, introducing a remanufacturing subsidy will incentivize the 
industrial decision maker to remanufacture products more frequently at the cost of a shorter 
product life. On the other hand, imposing a higher disposal fee incentivizes the decision maker 
to prolong the product life at the cost of a higher disposal fraction of end-of-life products. The 
analytical results culminated in Proposition 4.4 and 4.5 imply that, counter-intuitively, increas-
ing the remanufacturing subsidy may result in more raw materials consumptions while increas-
ing the disposal fee may result in more wastes being dumped at landfills. As shown in the last 
two graphs in Figure 8, the disposal rate increases with the remanufacturing subsidy and the 
disposal fee after the subsidy reaches $44.47 and the fee reaches $0.04/lb. For instance, the 
wisdom that public landfills (operated by local community) can convert wastes to other envi-
ronmental-friendly alternatives by charging a higher tipping fee is widely observed in the litera-
ture and/or government reports [32]. However, this study demonstrated that the ramifications 
resulted from a higher disposal cost may actually harm the environment. Therefore, any form 
of remanufacturing subsidy or disposal penalty should be carefully examined before implemen-
tation. 
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Furthermore, considering the less than stable economic conditions of nowadays, it is desira-
ble to provide guidelines for the government regarding how policies should be adjusted timely 
and properly in response to the uncertainties. In this regard, Proposition 4.6 provides such a 
guideline for policy makers to adjust the remanufacturing subsidy and disposal fee when the 
remanufacturing cost volatility varies. Such a guideline, we think, will be vital as the economic 
conditions become even more uncertain. 
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CHAPTER 5 
REMANUFACTURING AND REPLACEMENT DECISIONS UNDER  
OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE COST UNCERTAINTY 
5.1 Background and Objectives 
 
In recent years, there have been much interests in remanufacturing because of its focus on 
sustainability with often positive environmental as well as economic impacts [11]. During the 
remanufacturing process, a product is recovered at a part level with worn-out parts being re-
placed by new ones and durable parts being reused again. For example, in photocopier remanu-
facturing, mechanical parts such as bushings are replaced by new ones and electrical modules 
such as scanning motor are reused [47]. In single-use camera remanufacturing, plastic covers 
are replaced while printed circuit boards and lenses are reused.  
In current industrial practice, the key driver of the remanufacturing process is the economic 
value of the reused parts. Overall, remanufacturing programs can save companies 40%–65% of 
the manufacturing cost [1]. In particular, Xerox's remanufacturing program saved $200 million 
in material and part cost in less than five years [5]. Given these economic benefits, substantial 
efforts have been made by practitioners from a variety of industries to retrieve the potential 
value in the used parts by improving their durability. Thanks to these efforts, from the product 
design perspective, photocopier can be remanufactured up to 6 times [63]; single-use camera 
can be remanufactured up to 5 times [64]; tire casings and computer chips can be reused up to 
3 and 4 times, respectively [5]. However, Ayres and Ayres [65] claimed that the appropriate 
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number of times a product should be remanufactured before being replaced is essentially driv-
en by the economic factors such as operations and maintenance (O&M) costs.  
In this paper, we further develop the research question in the line of Ayres and Ayres [65]. 
Namely, the aim of this paper is to answer what the optimal remanufacturing and replacement 
policies are for the non-durable parts and for the product. This type of study is critical for the 
maintenance and replacement research as one could view the remanufacturing as a very sus-
tainable means of a maintenance process. At this point in time, however, to our knowledge, 
there are few quantitative studies addressing this critical issue in the literature – especially 
when the O&M costs have uncertainties. We note that, in this paper, we will use the terms pol-
icies and decisions interchangeably. 
Toward this goal, we assume that a product consists of durable and non-durable parts with 
uncertain, yet different, O&M costs. Moreover, to aim for more concrete analyses and intui-
tions, we consider a firm that leases a product to a service provider, and the firm is assumed to 
be responsible for the O&M costs of the product. The O&M costs for the durable parts and the 
non-durable parts are assumed to follow uncorrelated geometric Brownian motion (GBM) pro-
cesses. Throughout the product's life-cycle, the firm has two options for the product: remanu-
facturing option and replacement option. With these options, the firm has the right, but not the 
obligation, to remanufacture or replace the product at any point. In particular, the exercise of 
the remanufacturing option triggers the ultimate maintenance for the product by replacing the 
non-durable parts with new ones. The replacement option triggers the replacement of the 
product as a whole. Under this framework, this study attempts to 
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(1) Formulate and analyze model of product remanufacturing and replacement decisions from 
a real options perspective when the O&M costs for both durable parts (reused in remanu-
facturing process) and non-durable parts (replaced in remanufacturing process) follow 
GBM processes. 
(2) Investigate the optimal timing to remanufacture and replace a product under uncertain 
O&M costs, and derive the appropriate number of times that the product should be re-
manufactured. 
(3) Examine how the O&M cost uncertainties and other relevant factors influence the firm's 
remanufacturing and replacement decisions. 
(4) Evaluate the efficiency of the governmental remanufacturing subsidy in reducing the land-
fill disposal, and provide critical guidelines for the governmental sustainable policies. 
Furthermore, the analytical and numerical findings include that (i) as the O&M costs become 
more (less) volatile, it is beneficial to exercise the remanufacturing and the replacement op-
tions later (earlier); (ii) a higher (lower) remanufacturing cost results in a shorter (longer) ex-
pected product life because it becomes less attractive for the firm to conduct ultimate mainte-
nance for the product through remanufacturing; (iii) an increase of the remanufacturing subsidy 
may result in more landfill disposal per unit time, and the government policy maker is advised 
to carefully examine the industrial conditions before any implementation of a new sustainable 
subsidy or adjustment of the existing sustainable subsidy. We hope that the questions raised 
and addressed in this study will stimulate relevant discussions among industrial practitioners, 
governmental regulators, and academics. 
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5.2 Model 
In this section, let us consider a firm that leases a product to a service provider and the service 
provider utilizes the product to serve customers. Meanwhile, the firm is responsible for the 
O&M costs. Such leasing contracts exist in a variety of industries, such as photocopier leasing 
contract between Xerox and Staples and mail processing machine leasing contract between Pit-
ney Bowes and USPS. Furthermore, at any time point, the firm has an option to remanufacture 
the product by replacing the non-durable parts, or replace the whole product by a new one. 
The exercise of these options is driven by the O&M cost of the durable parts which deteriorate 
over the product's life cycle, and the O&M cost of the non-durable parts which are replaced af-
ter each remanufacturing process. Prior to investigating the optimal timing of product remanu-
facturing and replacement, we first provide the key assumptions of our model. 
Assumption 5.1  There exists a leasing contract between the firm and the service 
provider specifying the leasing price per unit product P ($/unit product/unit time). Furthermore, 
the contract is sufficiently long that the expiration of the contract is not considered in the model. 
Assumption 5.2  The durable-part O&M cost CD ($/unit time) and non-durable-part 
O&M cost CN ($/unit time) follow two uncorrelated GBM processes. Specifically,  
(5.2)                                                                                
(5.1)                                                                                 
NNNNNN
DDDDDD
dzCdtCdC
dzCdtCdC




 
Here D  and N  represent the instantaneous drift; D  and N  represent the instantaneous 
volatility; Ddz  and Ndz  are two standard Brownian motion increments. Moreover, the starting 
O&M cost for the durable parts (when the product is new) and the starting O&M cost for the 
non-durable parts (right after remanufacturing) are 0DC  and 0NC , respectively. 
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The volatilities in these two GBM processes are the sources of uncertainties in our remanu-
facturing and replacement model. As in the case of photocopiers, the durable-part O&M cost 
includes the costs associated with sensors cleaning, chip replacement, etc. Furthermore, as a 
photocopier ages and deteriorates, the fuser assembly may overheat and cause severe damage 
to the motor, which could cost over a hundred dollars to recover [66]. Meanwhile, the non-
durable-part O&M cost includes the costs associated with bearings re-oil, bushings replace-
ment, etc. The volatility of the O&M costs could result from the uncertain frequency of clean-
ing, replacement, and re-oil process. Moreover, modeling O&M cost as a GBM cost can be ob-
served in the literature [67][68]. 
The justification for the uncorrelated GBM processes is given as follows. In recent years, the 
increase of the modularized design facilitates the maintenance of the products and results in 
more independently O&M costs for parts and modules [69]. For instance, the maintenance for 
the scanning motor is independent of the maintenance for the bearings and bushings in the 
photocopiers [66]. Furthermore, the assumption of uncorrelated GBM processes facilitates the 
mathematical tractability of our model, and the case of correlated GBM processes is beyond 
the scope of this study, which could serve as an interesting future extension. 
Assumption 5.3 The remanufacturing cost for a used product is RK  ($/unit product); the 
manufacturing cost for a new product is AK  ($/unit product) where AR KK  . The period to manu-
facture a new product or remanufacture a used product is negligible. 
A typical remanufacturing process includes cleaning, testing, disassembling, component re-
placement, and assembling processes. Here AR KK   implies a cost saving in the remanufactur-
ing process due to the economic value of reused parts, which is the key driver of product re-
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manufacturing [13]. This simplifying assumption of negligible manufacturing/remanufacturing 
period is made to focus on the remanufacturing and replacement decisions without diluting our 
attention to various transient issues such as how to make best decisions during the manufactur-
ing/remanufacturing process. 
5.2.1 Remanufacturing Decision 
Under the assumptions and modeling framework presented above, the remanufacturing deci-
sion can be interpreted as an optimal stopping problem. Specifically, since the durable parts are 
not replaced during the remanufacturing process, at any time point, the decision maker 
measures the non-durable-part O&M cost and the project value to decide whether or not to 
exercise the remanufacturing option. The project value is defined as the sum of the discounted 
cash flow resulted from the product and the value of remanufacturing option. Due to the na-
ture of the optimal-stopping problem, there exists a threshold of the non-durable-part O&M 
cost above which it is optimal to remanufacture the product. Furthermore, before the exercise 
of the remanufacturing option, the project value ),( ND CCV  must satisfy the following Bellman's 
equation [59].  
(5.3)                                                                        ],|[)( NDND CCdVEdtCCPVdt   
where   is the discount rate per unit time, and E[] the operator of expected value. The left-
hand side of (5.3) is the return per unit time for holding the remanufacturing option. On the 
right-hand side, the first term is the immediate profit from the product, and the second term is 
the expected depreciation of the product value, which is conditioned on the instantaneous 
O&M costs.  
Furthermore, by Ito's lemma, the following equation can be derived 
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Substituting eq. (5.3) into eq. (5.4), the following equation can be derived 
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To guarantee the convergence of the differential equation (5.5), we assume  D  and 
 N  (Costa Lima and Suslick, 2006). It can be verified that the product value function is (see 
Appendix Q for proof) 
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Suppose CNR is the threshold of non-durable-part O&M cost above which it is optimal to ex-
ercise the remanufacturing option, then the following boundary conditions must be satisfied. 
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Equation (5.7) is the value-matching condition, which guarantees that, at the threshold CNR, 
the current project value equals to the project value after remanufacturing (i.e., the non-
durable part is like new) minus the remanufacturing cost. Meanwhile, the smooth-pasting con-
ditions assure the continuity and smoothness at the exercising point. 
Proposition 5.1 Given   N0 , the threshold of non-durable-part O&M cost for the re-
manufacturing option NRC  is the solution of 0])([)1( 0
1
0 
 NNN
NNRNNNRNRN CCCKC

 . 
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Proof is given in Appendix R, and the value of CNR can be solved by computational software 
(e.g., Matlab). As soon as the non-durable-part O&M cost is observed to be not less than CNR, it 
is beneficial for the firm to remanufacture the product. The remanufacturing process reduces 
the non-durable-part O&M cost to the original level, which implies a higher project value. Fur-
thermore, the remanufacturing decision is irrelevant to the durable-part O&M cost as this O&M 
cost is not influenced by the remanufacturing process. 
Proposition 5.2 Given   N0 , 0


N
NRC

, 0

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N
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C
C
. 
Proof is given in Appendix R. This proposition indicates that, as the non-durable-part O&M 
cost becomes more volatile, the remanufacturing option threshold increases, which implies that 
the exercise of remanufacturing option should be deferred. This is because, as the non-durable-
part O&M cost volatility increases, the flexibility to remanufacture the product at any time 
point (i.e., remanufacturing option) becomes more valuable, and it is beneficial to hold the op-
tion for longer. Moreover, the increase of the remanufacturing cost results in a higher remanu-
facturing option threshold. Intuitively, a higher remanufacturing cost KR implies a higher penalty 
to exercise the option, which incentivizes the firm to defer the exercise of the remanufacturing 
option. Meanwhile, a higher level of the original O&M cost for the non-durable parts implies a 
lower benefit of exercising the remanufacturing option, and hence, incentivizes the firm to ex-
ercise the remanufacturing option later. 
Thus far, we have performed analysis against the non-durable-part O&M cost threshold for 
the remanufacturing option. We now proceed to study the expected life of the non-durable 
parts. 
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Proposition 5.3 Given 2/2NN   , the expected life of non-durable parts 
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The proof of Proposition 5.3 and Corollary 5.1 is given in Appendix S. The fact that the ex-
pected life of non-durable parts increases with the O&M cost volatility and the remanufacturing 
cost is intuitive. As for 0/ 0  NN CT , even though a higher level of the starting non-durable-part 
O&M cost CN0 results in a higher threshold of the O&M cost (Proposition 5.2), it also sets a 
higher starting point of the non-durable-part O&M cost. Therefore, the overall impact of CN0 is 
not simple and straightforward. This corollary indicates that the expected life of non-durable 
parts decreases with the starting O&M cost for the non-durable parts CN0. 
5.2.2 Replacement Decision 
Suppose CDA and CNA are the durable-part O&M cost and the non-durable-part O&M cost when 
the replacement option is exercised, respectively. Hence, the value-matching and smooth-
pasting conditions at the replacement point become 
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Proposition 5.4 Given   ND ,0 , it is optimal to exercise the replacement option if 
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Proof is given in Appendix T. This proposition provides the threshold condition for the re-
placement option. An any time, by observing the O&M cost for durable and non-durable parts, 
the firm measures the value of ),( ND CCF  and decides whether or not to retire and replace the 
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product. ),( ND CCF  is defined as the value-difference function, which measures the difference 
between the new project value (after replacement) and the current project value. Intuitively, as 
soon as the value-difference equals to the manufacturing cost, it is optimal to retire the current 
product and replace it with a new one. 
Furthermore, we note that, due to the nature of GBM process, at the replacement point, the 
value of CDA and CNA may (if not must) be different case by case, depending on how both O&M 
costs evolve with respect to time. Hence, there is no individual threshold for the durable-part 
O&M cost and the non-durable-part O&M cost for the replacement option. 
Corollary 2: Given   ND ,0 , 0
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See Appendix T for proof. This corollary provides an alternative interpretation for Proposi-
tion 5.3. That is, given a fixed non-durable-part (durable-part) O&M cost, there exists a thresh-
old of the durable-part (non-durable-part) O&M cost above which it is optimal to exercise the 
replacement option. 
Proposition 5.5 Given a fixed non-durable-part O&M cost, 0
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Proof is given in Appendix U. As the durable-part or the non-durable-part O&M cost be-
comes more volatile, given a fixed non-durable-part (durable-part) O&M cost, the correspond-
ing durable-part (non-durable-part) O&M cost threshold for the replacement option becomes 
higher. In other words, a higher O&M cost volatility incentivizes the firm to hold the product for 
longer, and defer the exercise of the replacement option. This is because a higher O&M cost 
volatility implies a higher value of the replacement option. Similarly, a higher manufacturing 
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cost also implies a deferred exercise of the replacement option, which leads to a longer product 
life. 
Lemma 1 Given   ND ,0 , 0
NA
DA
dC
dC
. 
Proof is given in Appendix V. According to Proposition 5.1, throughout the life-cycle of the 
product, the maximum non-durable-part O&M cost is CNR, at which the product is remanufac-
tured and the non-durable-part O&M cost is restored to the original level of CN0. Therefore, by 
this lemma, the minimum durable-part O&M cost that can trigger the exercise of replacement 
option can be derived as presented in the following proposition. 
Proposition 5.6 The lower bound of the durable-part O&M cost to exercise the replace-
ment option is DAC  where DAC  is the solution of 0]))([()1( 0
1
0 
 DDD
DDADDDRADAD CCCKKC
  . 
Proof is given in Appendix V. This proposition implies that a product will not be retired and 
replaced until the durable-part O&M cost is greater than DAC . Also, we want emphasize that, 
different from the concept of threshold, it may not be optimal to exercise the replacement op-
tion even if the durable-part O&M cost is beyond this lower bound. The actual durable-part 
O&M cost triggering the exercise of the replacement option depends on the instantaneous non-
durable-part O&M cost. By this proposition, the lower bound of the expected life of the product 
can also be derived as )2//()ln(ln 20 DDDDA CCT   . 
Corollary 5.3 Given   D0 , 0
R
DA
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. 
Proof is given in Appendix W. This corollary indicates that, as the remanufacturing cost in-
creases, the lower bound of the durable-part O&M cost to replace the product decreases. Intui-
tively, as product remanufacturing becomes more expensive, the alternative option of replacing 
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the product becomes more attractive. Therefore, the condition to exercise the replacement op-
tion becomes less restricted (i.e., the lower bound DAC  decreases).  
Thus far, a series of critical analytical results have been presented. In what follows, we will 
perform an extensive numerical study to further illustrate these findings and gain more obser-
vations. 
5.3 Numerical Study 
In this section, we utilize the remanufacturing and replacement decisions of photocopiers as 
the study case to conduct the numerical analysis. Photocopiers are widely leased by manufac-
turers such as Xerox and Fujifilm to service provider such as Staples and Office Depot to provide 
copying, printing, and scanning services to the customers. Meanwhile, photocopier remanufac-
turing is one of the most mature and widely implemented remanufacturing processes. Xerox 
has developed a remanufacturing system since late 1980s to maximize the profitability of oper-
ations, and has saved millions of dollars in raw materials and disposal costs (Kerr and Ryan, 
2001). Let us first present the parameter values used in this study. Even though some of the 
parameter values are hypothetical due to the lack of the empirical data, we have consulted lo-
cal Staples managers as well as others (Fuji Xerox, 2002; Geyer et al., 2007). The values are 
summarized in Table 1, and some of the key numerical results are given in Table 2. 
Table 3. Numerical Study Parameter Values 
Parameters Symbol Values  
Monthly discount rate  (%/month)   0.10  
Leasing price per unit product  ($/month, Assumption 5.1) P  150  
Original durable-part O&M cost ($/month, Assumption 5.2) 0DC  25 
 
Original non-durable-part O&M cost ($/month, Assumption 5.2) 0NC  50 
 
65 
 
Drift of durable-part O&M cost (Assumption 5.2) D  0.06 
 
Drift of non-durable-part O&M cost (Assumption 5.2) N  0.08 
 
Volatility of durable-part O&M cost (Assumption 5.2) D  0.03 
 
Volatility of non-durable-part O&M cost (Assumption 5.2) N  0.04 
 
Remanufacturing cost per unit product ($/unit product, Assumption 5.3) RK  350 
 
Manufacturing cost per unit product ($/unit product, Assumption 5.3) AK  600 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Numerical Results 
Decisions Solutions  
Non-durable-part O&M cost threshold for remanufacturing option NRC  
111.24 
($/month) 
 
Expected life of non-durable part NT  10.10 (month)  
Lower bound of durable-part O&M cost for replacement option DAC  
67.46 
($/month) 
 
Lower bound of expected life of product (month) 16.67 (month)  
   
Furthermore, Figure 11 shows the variation of CNR (i.e., the non-durable-part O&M cost 
threshold for remanufacturing option) and TN (i.e., the expected non-durable-part life) with σN 
(i.e., the non-durable-part O&M cost volatility), KR (i.e., the remanufacturing cost), and CN0 (i.e., 
the original non-durable-part O&M cost). If a parameter value is not changing in the sensitivity 
analysis, it takes the value in Table 4. The numerical results in Figure 11 align with the analytical 
findings given in Proposition 5.2 and corollary 5.1. 
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Figure 11. Variation of CNR and TN with Volatility, Remanufacturing Cost, and Starting O&M Cost 
Given the parameter values listed in Table 1, the GBM process of the durable-part O&M cost 
and the non-durable-part O&M cost become NNNN dzCdtCdC 04.008.0  and DDDD dzCdtCdC 03.006.0  , 
respectively. Also, the project-value-difference function ),( ND CCF  becomes 
(5.13)                                     312586.1991316.104088.1951.4),( 66.022.0   NDNDND CCCCCCF  
By plugging in the instantaneous durable-part O&M cost and non-durable-part O&M cost in-
to (5.13), the decision make can compare the value of ),( ND CCF  to the manufacturing cost 
600AK  ($/unit product) and decide whether or not to exercise the replacement option. 
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Figure 12. Sample Paths of O&M Costs and F(CD, CN) in 60 Months 
To better characterize the product remanufacturing and replacement decisions numerically, 
we use Monte Carlo method to simulate the GBM processes of both O&M costs. Figure 12 dis-
plays the sample paths of the durable-part O&M cost (i.e., blue line), the non-durable-part 
O&M cost (i.e., red line), and the derived path of project-value-difference function ),( ND CCF  (i.e., 
green line). In this sample case, the remanufacturing option threshold (i.e., CN =111.24) is first 
reached around the 15th month, and hence, the product is remanufactured for the first time. 
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Sequentially, the remanufacturing option threshold is reached for the second time around the 
29th month. We note that, till the 29th month, the project-value-difference function is below 
the manufacturing cost KA =$600, and hence, the replacement option is yet exercised. Around 
the 50th month, the difference between the new project value and the current project value 
hits the manufacturing cost threshold, and hence, the product is retired and replaced with a 
new one. The virtual paths after the replacement point (the 50.43th month) are given here to 
provide a complete picture about how the O&M costs and the derived project-value-difference 
function evolve with respect to time. By the virtual path, it can be observed that, the point 
when the remanufacturing option threshold is reached for the third time (around the 54th 
month) comes after the replacement. Hence, the product is remanufactured twice before being 
retired and replaced. Furthermore, we note that, when the replacement option is exercised, 
the durable-part O&M cost is approximately $130 per month, which is greater than the lower 
bound of $67.46 per month given in Table 2. 
Government Sustainable Policy 
From a social planner’s perspective, remanufacturing is one of the most important sustainable 
processes to reduce raw materials consumption and conserve energy as well as landfill space. 
Therefore, the usage of subsidies as an economic instrument to incentivize and facilitate the 
remanufacturing processes has significantly increased at all of local and national levels. For in-
stance, in California, remanufacturers are subsidized $0.28 per pound for remanufacturing the 
electronic products. In New York, remanufacturers receive tax credits that are commensurate 
with the number of employees and/or the durability of capital investment. However, critical 
questions such as whether the remanufacturing subsidies are environmentally viable have not 
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been well answered by either governmental regulators or academics. Hence, in this study, we 
numerically examine the impact of the remanufacturing subsidy on the amount of wastes (in 
weight) disposed at landfill. 
Assumption 5.4 Through remanufacturing, α fraction of the product (in weight) is re-
placed and disposed at landfill with no cost, and the weight of a unit product is W (lb). 
Given this assumption, if a product was remanufactured N times before being replaced, the 
total landfill disposal throughout the product life-cycle is WN )1(  . The simplifying assumption 
of a negligible landfill disposal cost enables us to focus on the remanufacturing and the re-
placement decisions without being distracted by how the disposal cost influences these deci-
sions, which is beyond the scope of this study. Moreover, mathematically, the disposal cost can 
be easily incorporated into the remanufacturing cost without affecting any analytical results 
presented so far.  
Assumption 5.5 The government is subsidizing the firm S ($/unit product) for remanufac-
turing a product. 
By Assumption 5.5, from the firm’s perspective, receiving a remanufacturing subsidy is 
equivalent to a decrease in the remanufacturing cost. Furthermore, the impact of a higher re-
manufacturing subsidy on the firm’s remanufacturing and replacement decisions is two-fold:  
(i) A shorter life of the non-durable parts – according to Corollary 5.1, a lower remanufacturing 
cost (i.e., a higher remanufacturing subsidy) results in a lower threshold of non-durable-part 
O&M cost for the remanufacturing option. Hence, the product is remanufactured more fre-
quently, and the expected life of the non-durable parts is shortened. 
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(ii) A longer life of the durable parts – accordingly to Corollary 5.3, a lower remanufacturing 
cost (i.e., a higher remanufacturing subsidy) results in a higher lower bound of the replace-
ment option threshold. Hence, the product is retired and replaced less frequently, and the 
expected life of the durable parts is prolonged. 
Given these two sustainably conflicting impacts, it is desirable to investigate the total envi-
ronmental impact resulted from a remanufacturing subsidy in terms of the amount of wastes 
disposed at landfills. Toward this goal, we consider three scenarios: (i) without remanufacturing 
subsidy, (ii) remanufacturing subsidy S = $20, and (iii) remanufacturing subsidy S = $40. There-
fore, while all the other parameter values remain the same as given in Table 1, the resulted re-
manufacturing costs become KR = $250, KR = $230, and KR = $210, respectively. Furthermore, 
the GBM paths were generated 1,000 times for each scenario, and the disposal fraction in the 
remanufacturing process α=0.5 (see Assumption 5.4). The experimental results are summarized 
in Table 3, and the symbols used in Table 3 are defined after the table. 
Table 5. Experimental Results of Monte Carlo Simulation 
 MN (TN) KR = $250 (S=$0) KR = $230 (S=$20) KR = $210 (S=$40)  
 M0 (T0) 3 (18.23) 1 (16.17) 0 (0.00)  
 M1 (T1) 125 (31.76) 59 (31.93) 14 (30.01)  
 M2 (T2) 677 (46.73) 538 (45.22) 368 (43.31)  
 M3 (T3) 194 (54.14) 395 (54.04) 597 (52.92)  
 M4 (T4) 1 (66.16) 7 (65.89) 21 (64.61)  
 T 46.23 48.04 49.31  
 L 2.03W 2.17W 2.31W  
 LPUT 0.0451 0.0437 0.0479  
71 
 
MN  the number of scenarios where the product is remanufactured N times before being re-
placed. 
TN  the average product life (month) of the scenarios where the product is remanufactured 
N times  before being replaced. 
T the average product life (month) of all the scenarios,  N NNTMT 1000
1  
L the average amount of landfill disposal (lb) of all the scenarios,   N N WNML )1(1000
1
  
LPUT the average landfill disposal per unit time (lb/month) of all the scenarios, 
  


1000
1
)1(
1000
1
k
k
k
T
WN
LPUT

 where Nk and Tk represent the number of remanufacturing and  
 the product life in scenarios k, respectively. 
The following observations can be derived from the numerical results presented in Table 3. 
Observation 1: in our experiment, the number of remanufacturing throughout a product life-
cycle tends to be higher in the scenario with a lower remanufacturing cost (i.e., a higher re-
manufacturing subsidy). 
Observation 2: in our experiment, a lower remanufacturing cost (i.e., a higher remanufacturing 
subsidy) results in a higher average product life. Intuitively, with a lower remanufacturing cost, 
the product is remanufactured more frequently. Therefore, the non-durable-part O&M cost is 
kept in a relatively low level, which incentivizes the firm to operate the product for longer. 
Observation 3: in our experiment, a lower remanufacturing cost (i.e., a higher remanufacturing 
subsidy) results in a higher level of the landfill disposal throughout the product life-cycle. Intui-
tively, with a lower remanufacturing cost, there is a higher chance for the product to go 
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through more remanufacturing processes before being replaced. Therefore, more non-durable 
parts may be consumed and disposed throughout the product life-cycle. 
Observation 4: in our experiment, the lowest average landfill disposal per unit time (LPUT) is 
observed when the remanufacturing subsidy is set to $20 (i.e., remanufacturing cost is $230). 
This implies that introducing a new remanufacturing subsidy or increasing the existing remanu-
facturing subsidy may not always result in less landfill disposal per unit time. Hence, any eco-
nomic instrument of a similar nature as the remanufacturing subsidy described in this experi-
ment needs to be carefully examined by the policy makers before its implemention. 
By running additional simulation experiments, more numerical results can be generated and 
analyzed to gain further observations. Also, statistical methods can be utilized to obtain more 
general conclusions regarding how the remanufacturing subsidy influences the firm's remanu-
facturing and replacement decisions, as well as the corresponding landfill disposal. 
5.4 Managerial Insights and Policy Implications 
In this chapter, we considered the uncertainties in O&M costs for both durable parts and 
non-durable parts of a product. By modeling these O&M costs as GBM processes, we investi-
gated a firm’s product remanufacturing and replacement decisions from a real options perspec-
tive. We also examined the impact of government’s remanufacturing subsidy on these decisions 
and the corresponding landfill disposal. Via analytical and numerical studies, a series of mana-
gerial insights and policy implication were derived. Specifically, as the O&M costs become more 
volatile, it is beneficial to defer the exercise of the remanufacturing option and the replacement 
option because the option values are higher. Also, with a higher remanufacturing cost, it is ex-
pected that the product will be replaced earlier, which implies a shorter product life.  
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Furthermore, from a government policy maker’s perspective, increasing the remanufactur-
ing subsidy incentivizes the firm to remanufacture the product more frequently, which implies a 
shorter life of the non-durable parts (which are replaced in remanufacturing process). On the 
other hand, given the more frequent remanufacturing, the overall O&M cost of the product is 
kept in a relatively low level, and it is beneficial for the firm to operate the product for longer, 
which implies a longer life of the durable parts. Given these conflicting ramifications, it is ad-
vised that the government not unconditionally advocate the remanufacturing process via eco-
nomic incentives. As numerically demonstrated in this study, in certain cases, a higher remanu-
facturing subsidy may result in more landfill disposal per unit time, which is probably against 
the governmental policy maker’s original intention. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSIONS 
First of all, we note that the statement "See Appendix A for proof" in the paragraph after As-
sumption 3.9 can be considered as  imprecise. The precise statement should be "See Appendix 
A for the deduction of these conditions". Also, we note that the convergence condition ρ >  in 
Chapter 4 is necessary for analytical investigations, which can be widely observed in literature 
[59][84][85][86]. 
Furthermore, in Chapter 4, the maintenance cost is assumed to proportional to the remanufac-
turing cost. This is because the primary goal of maintenance is to preserve the reliable opera-
tion of the product that is providing services. The maintenance process is subject to costs asso-
ciated with inspection, adjustment, and component-replacement. Typically, the maintenance 
cost increases with operating time as the components gradually deteriorate [55][56]. Since the 
maintenance cost and the remanufacturing cost share similar costing factors such as cleaning, 
testing as well as component-replacement, and both increases with the operating time, the 
maintenance cost is assumed to be linear to the remanufacturing cost C [57][58]. Also, the pos-
sible relaxation of this assumption can be considered as one of the future works. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this article, three research works regarding the critical decisions in sustainable processes 
such as product recycling and remanufacturing were presented. Based on these research works, 
a series of managerial insights  and policy implications were derived from analytical and numer-
ical analyses. Specifically, 
(1) In the first study, we formulated and analyzed CLSC models for a manufacturer and a collec-
tor with variable product weight and collection rate. We demonstrated that there is an in-
herent conflict between two environmental factors of the product weight and the collection 
rate, which implies that manufacturers in practice may not be able to pursue both a lower 
level of the product weight and a higher level of the collection rate simultaneously, and ef-
forts to improve one environmental factor may lead to an unintended negative impact on 
the other factor. Consequently, under certain conditions (e.g., the marginal recycling bene-
fit or collecting subsidy is sufficiently high), the landfill quantity increases with the marginal 
recycling benefit or collecting subsidy. Moreover, the landfill quantity in the centralized 
CLSC can be achieved or even reduced in the decentralized CLSC via appropriate financial 
instruments. All in all, implementing the subsidy/fee system in CLSC’s may not always be 
environmentally desirable, and may result in more landfill quantity relative to the non-
subsidy/fee scenario, especially when the subsidy is sufficiently high.  
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(2) In the second study, from a real options perspective, we modeled and analyzed the remanu-
facturing decision making by a manufacturer who leases a product to a service provider 
when the remanufacturing cost follows a GBM process.  By deriving the appropriate optimal 
timing of the remanufacturing and performing sensitivity analysis with and without the gov-
ernment subsidy and fee, a series of managerial insights and policy implications were de-
rived, and numerically illustrated. Some of the critical findings are: (i) under certain condi-
tions, increasing the remanufacturing subsidy or the disposal fee will result in more raw ma-
terials consumption and landfill disposal, which is against the intention of the policy makers 
introducing these economic instruments; (ii) if the remanufacturing cost becomes more vol-
atile, it is advised that the policy maker should increase the remanufacturing subsidy or re-
duce the disposal fee to avoid more negative environmental impacts.  
(3) In the third study, we considered the uncertainties in O&M costs for both durable parts and 
non-durable parts of a product. By modeling these O&M costs as GBM processes, we inves-
tigated a firm’s product remanufacturing and replacement decisions from a real options 
perspective. We also examined the impact of government’s remanufacturing subsidy on 
these decisions and the corresponding landfill disposal. Via analytical and numerical studies, 
a series of managerial insights and policy implication were derived. Specifically, as the O&M 
costs become more volatile, it is beneficial to defer the exercise of the remanufacturing op-
tion and the replacement option because the option values are higher. Also, with a higher 
remanufacturing cost, it is expected that the product will be replaced earlier, which implies 
a shorter product life.  
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Given the less than stable current economic condition and the increasing sustainable efforts 
from industries, government, and environmental groups, it is highly desirable to understand the 
critical decisions in terms of sustainable product design, used-product collection, and remanu-
facturing relevant investments. Toward this goal, the questions raised and addressed in this ar-
ticle is timely (if not urgent), and we hope that it can serve as a reference point to stimulate the 
discussion on this important topic of government policies toward remanufacturing in particular 
and sustainability in general. 
Moreover, this paper provides the basis for a number of interesting extensions. For instance, 
a menu of options such as refurbishing and demanufacturing can be concurrently considered 
along with recycling and remanufacturing. Other interesting extensions of our models include 
(i) consider the competition among multiple manufacturers and collectors in closed loop supply 
chains, (ii) utilizing backward optimization approach to investigate the scenario where the re-
manufacturing and replacement option expires after some time point (e.g., a hard-stop of 
product life is defined in the leasing contract); (iii) formulating a Stackelberg game to consider 
the competition between manufacturers and service providers. 
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APPENDIX 
A. Deduction of Conditions in Assumption 3.9 
  In the CR model, if S 8  and SKa /0 , we have 
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These conditions are all guaranteed by Assumption 3.9. 
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H. Proof for Propositions 3.7 
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

 
  If 
)2(
)(2
0
0



KSaK
KaSS
 , then 
)(2
)(2)(4
)2(
)(2
    )()(  
0
0
2
0
22
0
02
0
3
-






aK
aKKaSKK
KSaK
KaSS
KaKSLL CRGDR   
  Otherwise (i.e., 
)2(
)(2
0
0
0



KSaK
KaSS
  and 
)(2
)(2)(4
0
0
2
0
22



aK
aKKaSKK
 ), CRGDR LL - . 
K
aSKKaS
KaSSKSaSKKaS
aSKKKaSKKLL GDRDR
)(4)(
0  
])()[(4])(2[)(4)(2  
))((4)()(4    
0
22
0
0
2
0
22
0
0
22
0
22
-







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Otherwise (i.e., 
K
aSKKaS )(4)( 0
22
0 
 ), GDRDR LL - . 
J. Proof of Equation (4.4) 
The structure of the differential equation (4.3)'s solution is in the form of 
(J1)                                                                             )( 21 21

 PCCACACV 


 
where 1  and 2  are the roots of the characteristic quadratic equation as follows: 
(J2)                                                                             0
2
1
2
1 222 





   
Solving (J2), we have 
22
2
22
2
22
2
22
1 2
2
1
2
1
        ,2
2
1
2
1































 
Since when 0C , the maintenance cost becomes negligible (Assumption 4.4), which indicates that 
the value of remanufacturing option approaches zero, and hence, 02 A . After eliminating this specula-
tive bubble, the general solution becomes equation (4.4). 
K. Proof of Proposition 4.1 
By equation (4.6), we have 
(K1)                                                                    
)()(
)('
1
1
1
1
1
11  





 



RR
R
CC
CM
A
 
Substitute (K1) into (4.5), we have 
(K3)                                                                    0)()1)((
(K2)                             ])('[)]()([)])(1()('[
111
111
0
1
011
0
1
101








CCCC
CCMCCMCMCCMH
RR
RRRRR
 
Hence,  0)()( 1010 

 CCCH R . Also, by equation (4.5) and (K2), we have 
(K4)              0)())(1()1()1()( 11111 0
2
111
2
011
1
11 
   CCCACCC
dC
dH
RRRR
R
 
Hence, obviously, the solution of equation (K3) exists and is unique. 
L. Proof of Proposition 4.2 
By equation (4.5), (4.6), and (K3), we have 
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  (L1)                                                       )lnln())(ln1()(
)lnln)((])[()ln1(
ln]lnln)1()[(
00101
1
1
000
1
1
1
01
1
0001
1
11111
111
11111
CCCCCCCCA
CCCCCCCC
CCCCCCCCCC
d
dH
RRRRR
RRRRR
RRRRRR













 
Suppose )lnln())(ln1()( 001011
1111 CCCCCCCCF
    where 0CC  , then we have 
(L3)                                                                                      0
)(
)('
(L2)                                                                                                                   0)(
11
01
1
01




C
CC
CF
CF

 
Obviously, 0)(1 RCF ,  and 0/ 1 ddH  accordingly. Hence, by (L3), we have 
(L4)                                                                                     0
/
/ 1
1



R
R
dCdH
ddHC 

 
Furthermore, by equation (4.4), we have 
(L5)                                                 2
2
1
222 32
2
22221 



















 
Since   0)(42
2
1
422 42
2
222222 














  , we have 01 




. Therefore, 
(L6)                                                                                      01
1












RR CC  
Also, by equation (4.5), (4.6), (L2), and (L3) we have 
(L7)                                                 0          0)()(
0
1
01
1
0
1
1
0
111 

dC
dC
CCC
dC
dH R
R
   
M. Proof of Proposition 4.3 
By equation (4.9), 4.(10), and (B2), we have 
(M2)            0)]]()([[)()(')(])1)[((    
(M1)         )]()([)]()([))]()('1)(()('[
1
10001
1
1
1
100
11111
1111








RRRRR
RRRRRRRR
CSWLCdCCCWLCdCC
CSWLCdCCCMCMCCWLCdCMH
 
(M5)              ])()([)(])())(('[)(
(M4)                                                                                                      0
/
/
        0)(
(M3)                 0)1())((])1()(")[)((
1
1000
1
10
1
1
2
1110
2
1110
111111
1
111111












RRRRRRR
R
R
R
RRRRR
R
CdCCCCWCCdCCCdW
dL
Hd
dCHd
dSHd
dS
dC
C
dS
Hd
CACCCACWLdCC
dC
Hd
 
Suppose 110003
111 )()()(  
  CdCCCCCF  where 0CC  , then we have 
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(M7)                                                                   0)()1()('
(M6)                                                                                         0)(
0
2
113
1
01003
1
1




CCCCF
CdCF




 
Therefore, 0)(3 CF  and 0/ dLdH  accordingly, which indicates that 
 (M8)                                                                                       0
/
/

R
R
dCHd
dLHd
dL
dC
 
 
N. Proof of Proposition 4.4 
(N2)                                                                                                
)ln(ln
)()ln(ln
)
2
(
(N1)                
)ln(ln
)()ln)(ln('
)
2
(
lnln
)()2/(
2
0
000
2
2
0
0
2
0
2
dS
dC
CCC
dCCCCC
W
dS
dC
CCC
CdCCCdC
W
dS
dC
dC
CC
CdW
d
dS
dC
dC
dQ
dS
dQ
R
RR
RRR
R
RR
RRRRR
R
R
R
R
R
























 
Suppose 0004 )()ln(ln)( dCCCCCCF    where 0CC  , then we have 0lnln/)( 04  CCdCCdF  and 
0)( 004  dCF . Hence, there exists C  that equation 0)(4 CF . Hence, by (M2), (M4), and (M2), we have 
(N3)                      
)(
)()(])1)[((
])([  
)(
)(')()(])1)[((
)(
            0      0
1
1
0010
00
1
1
0010
1
1111
1
1111


























C
CCWLCCC
dCCWL
C
CdCCWLCCC
CWLdS
CC
dC
dQ
dS
dC
dC
dQ
dS
dQ
R
R
R
R
 
O. Proof of Proposition 4.5 
Similarly to the deduction process in Appendix E, by (M2), (M8), and (M2), we have 
  (O1)                                                    )(])([)(
)]([])1)[((
                           
)](')()()[(
)]([])1)[((
            0      0
111
111
111
111
000
1
1
1
1001
0
1
1
1
1001








CCdCCCW
CSCCC
L
CdCCCdCW
CSCCC
LCC
dC
dQ
dL
dQ
R
R










 
P. Proof of Proposition 4.6 
By Proposition 4.5, we have 
(P1)                                          
)(
))](1)(([)(
])([
1
1
00
00
*
1
11













C
CCWLCC
CdCCWLS  
Let 
1
1
0
1
1
11
)(







C
CC
K , we have 
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(P2)        
)(
)]ln(ln)[(
)(
)ln)(()lnln(
21
1
0010
1
21
1
1
1
1
0
1
100
1
1
1111
1
1111111



 











 C
CCCCCC
C
CCCCCCCCCC
d
dK
 
Let )ln(ln)()( 0010
111 CCCCCCN 
  , then Manufacturer
Collector
Collection
τD(p) Landfill
(1 - τ)D(p)
Customers
Sales
D(p)
Take Back
τD(p)
Materials Flow  and 0
)( 111
1 01011
1 

 
C
CC
C
C
C
dC
dN

  . 
Hence, 
(P3)                                                                  0)ln(ln)()( 0010
111  CCCCCCN    
Therefore, 0
1

d
dK
, which results in 0
1
*

d
dS
. Furthermore, since 01 


d
d
, we have 0
*

d
dS
. 
Also, by Proposition 4.5, we have 
(P4)                                                 
)]()ln(ln)[(
)]([])1)[((
111
111
001
1
1001*




CCCCCW
CSCCC
L




 
(P5)                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
   
)]()ln(ln[)(
)]ln(ln[)]ln(ln[)ln)(ln(
2
001
222
00100
1
0010010
1
*
111
111111111




 CCCCCW
CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
d
dL




 
By (P3), we have 0)ln(ln 0010
111  CCCCC
  . Hence, 0
1
*

d
dL
 and 0
*

d
dL
. 
Q. Proof of Equation (5.6) 
The structure of the differential equation (5.5)'s solution is in the form of 
(Q1)                                      ),(

 PCCCACACACACCV
N
N
D
D
NNNNDDDDND
NNDD 



  
where D  and N  are the roots of the characteristic quadratic equations (Q2) and (Q3), respectively. 
(Q3)                                                                     0)
2
1
(
2
1
(Q2)                                                                     0)
2
1
(
2
1
222
222




NNNNN
DDDDD
 
Solving (Q2) and (Q3), we have 
02
2
1
2
1
     ,12
2
1
2
1
02
2
1
2
1
      ,12
2
1
2
1
22
2
2222
2
22
22
2
2222
2
22






























































NNNNNNNNNNNNNN
DDDDDDDDDDDDDD


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When NC  is finite and 0DC , the product value is finite; when DC  is finite and 0NC , the product 
value is also finite. Therefore, 0 ND AA  and the general solution becomes equation (5.6). 
R. Proof of Proposition 5.2 
By equation (5.6), we have  
(R2)                                                                                         0
2
2
1
2
(R1)                          02
2
1
222
2
2
2
32
2
2222





























NNNN
N
NNNNNNNNN
N
N







 
Since 0)(42
2
1
4)22( 22
2
222222 














 NNNNNNNNNN  , we have 0


N
N


. Hence, 
0







N
N
N
NR
N
NR CC



. Also, by Proposition 1, we have 0
)1(
)(
2






N
NR
N
NR KC



, 0
1
)(






N
NN
R
NR
K
C


, and 
0
1
)]/)(([






N
NNNRNR KC



. 
S. Proof of Proposition 5.3 
Substituting the smooth-pasting conditions (5.11) and (5.12) into the value-matching (5.10), we have 
(S2)             0))(()1()()1)((),(       
(S1)                                                      0
)()(
           









ANDNDNANDDDANDNNADA
A
N
NA
D
DA
NN
NA
DD
DA
KCCCCF
K
CCCC

  
Therefore, when 0),( ND CCF , the difference between the new project value after the abandonment 
and the current project value (before the abandonment) is not less than the manufacturing cost of the 
new product, which implies the exercise of the abandonment option. 
T. Proof of Proposition 5.4 and Corollary 5.1 
Substituting the smooth-pasting conditions (5.11) and (5.12) into the value-matching (5.10), we have 
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Therefore, when 0),( ND CCF , the difference between the new project value after the replacement 
and the current project value (before the replacement) is not less than the manufacturing cost of the 
new product, which implies the exercise of the replacement option. Furthermore,  
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U. Proof of Proposition 5.5 
By Proposition 3, given that the non-durable-part O&M cost is fixed, we have  
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By Proposition 5.3, given that the durable-part O&M cost is fixed, we have  
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V. Proof of Lemma 5.1 and Proposition 5.6 
By Proposition 5.1, the maximum non-durable-part O&M cost CNR is the solution of  
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Substituting (V1) into AND KCCF ),(  in Proposition 4, it can be derived that the minimum lower bound 
of durable-part O&M cost to exercise the replacement option CDA is the solution of (V2) 
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